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From the Editor:
I would like to first take a minute to thank Dr. Herbert Sherman of Long Island University for 6 excellent years of service as
Editor of the journal.His selfless service and professionalism were greatly appreciated and his presence is already missed. I think
that all involved with NEJE over the years enjoyed their time with Herb at the helm, as he was a true pro at the journal game.
With that being said, as I step into the lead role, it should be noted that we are now soliciting applications and/or nominations
for a new Editor at the journal.Additionally, we will be filling some other vacant positions, including that of Book Editor. If you
are interested, or know of anyone interested, please let us know.You can email me directly at shuartj@sacredheart.edu.
On to the issue itself, I believe we have four very intriguing and varied research articles for you.
The first article, by Richard C. Becherer, Marilyn M. Helms, and John P. McDonald, is titled “The Effect of Entrepreneurial
Marketing on Outcome Goals in SME’s.” Taking what Morris, Schindehutte,and LaForge (2002) created in terms of entrepreneur-
ial marketing dimensions, the authors then use various multivariate statistical techniques to drill deeper into these interesting
concepts.The findings of this study definitely point positively toward several positive directions for future research, and the
authors demonstrate that entrepreneurial marketing can affect positive outcomes.
The second article is by Giles Jackson and Randy Boxx.Their piece is titled “Persistence and Survival in Entrepreneurship:
The Case of the Wave Energy Conversion Corporation of America.” Given that, as the authors state,“90 percent of new entre-
preneurial businesses that are not able to attract venture capital fail within three years”, this article proves to be very thought
provoking.The basis for much of the case is drawn from an engaging interview with CEO Brian Cunningham.The crux of the
article centers on various forms of persistence, and the impact of persistence on the long-term viability of entrepreneurial com-
panies.
“Signaling, Resource-Based Power, and Pre-IPO Organizational Change” is the third article in this issue, and was authored by
John S. Pearlstein and Robert D. Hamilton. Converting innovation into value is the hallmark of entrepreneurship, and this arti-
cle tackles several salient issues regarding IPOs. I think that our readers will be particularly interested in the model of pre-IPO
organizational change and its effect on underpricing. I personally was quite fascinated with some of the background theory, and
in general, have always been interested in watching some companies adding executives just prior to the IPO in hopes of
quelling investor concerns; the results are not always as one would expect.
The final article in this issues comes via David J. Prottas and is titled “Self vs.Organizational Employment:The Neglected Case
of Positive Spillover.” With a survey (n=280), the author explores various components of work-to-family conflict, centered upon
CPAs.As expected, gender plays a key role in the study. I was particularly interested in this, having been raised in a house where
my father was very successfully self-employed.
Finally, I wanted to quickly announce that Sacred Heart University will be hosting the upcoming Academy of International
Business (U.S. Northeast Chapter) 2012 Annual Conference this October. I mention this because there will be a track in
“Entrepreneurship & Business Innovations,” and we have plans of utilizing some of the very best conference papers in an
upcoming issue of NEJE.
Joshua A. Shuart, Ph.D.
Editor, New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
Reference
Morris, M. H., Schindehutte, M. & LaForge, R.W. (2002). Entrepreneurial Marketing:A Construct for Integrating Emerging
Entrepreneurship and Marketing Perspectives, Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 10(4), 1–19.
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T his study examines how entrepreneurial marketingdimensions (proactiveness, opportunity focused,leveraging, innovativeness, risk taking, value cre-
ation, and customer intensity) are related to qualitative
and quantitative outcome measures for the SME and the
entrepreneur (including company success, customer suc-
cess, financial success, satisfaction with return goals, satis-
faction with growth goals, excellence, and the entrepre-
neur’s standard of living). Using factor analysis, three suc-
cess outcome variables (financial, customer, and strong
company success) emerged together. A separate factor analy-
sis identified satisfactory growth and return goals. Stepwise
regression revealed entrepreneurial marketing impacts out-
come variables, particularly value creation.Implications for
entrepreneurs and areas for research are included.
Keywords: entrepreneurial marketing; entrepreneur; value
creation; opportunity; leveraging; excellence
While marketing plays a significant role in successful organi-
zations, it can be argued that marketing is even more critical
for small to mid-sized enterprises (SMEs), for which the loss
or gain of a single customer can often determine firm sur-
vival.What has become increasingly apparent to researchers
is that conventional marketing practices are not always avail-
able or appropriate for entrepreneurial firms.The very fact of
its newness means a nascent business venture is more likely
to face both uncertain market conditions and limited
resources for marketing. When pursuing new opportunities
with limited resources, the entrepreneur must use innovative
approaches in the face of such constraints.While the market-
ing approaches used by entrepreneurs reflect this innovative
orientation, they may vary in their relationship or effect on
outcome goals. It is critical for a new venture to understand
which entrepreneurial marketing practices are most effective
and therefore important to achieve a variety of successful
outcome goals and ultimately for profitability and growth.
Therefore, the purpose of this article is to link entrepreneur-
ial marketing practices with outcome goals in SMEs.
Entrepreneurial Marketing 
The term “entrepreneurial marketing” merges two formerly
distinct disciplines and is used to describe the marketing
processes of firms pursuing opportunities in uncertain mar-
ket circumstances often under constrained resource condi-
tions (Collinson & Shaw, 2001; Hills, 1987; Omura, Calantone,
& Schmidt, 1993). Entrepreneurial marketing utilizes a “big
picture” perspective and focuses on creative approaches to
innovation, risk management, resource leveraging, and value
creation.The term describes a range of actions and responses
SMEs can employ (Becherer, Haynes, and Helms, 2008). Read,
Dew, Sarasvathy, Song, and Wilbank (2009) compared the mar-
keting approach of entrepreneurs versus managers with little
entrepreneurial expertise and confirmed significant differ-
ences exist when marketing under uncertainty. They found
managers without entrepreneurial expertise relied on predic-
tive marketing techniques while the entrepreneurs marketing
tactics used effectual or nonpredictive logic.
Beverland and Lockshin (2004) defined entrepreneurial
marketing as “effectual action”or the adaptation of marketing
theory for the unique needs of small businesses.These effec-
tual actions simultaneously address many issues:opportunity,
innovation, risk, and resource constraints. For the SME, these
actions are the task of the individual owner/operator.
Constant attention to marketing is critical to success for
newly launched or growing ventures (Hisrich, 1992;
Becherer, Halstead & Haynes, 2003; Becherer, Haynes, &
Fletcher, 2006). Simultaneously these decisions also pose
some of the greatest challenges to these ventures (Morris,
Schindehutte, & LaForge, 2002; Sarasvathy, 2001; Kirzner,
1997; Stokes, 2000; Carson 2001).
Because SMEs face specific constraints, they are set apart
from their larger business counterparts that have more longevi-
ty.Thus there is justification for the adoption of an entrepre-
neurial marketing philosophy (Birley, 1989, 1982), particularly
in highly innovative organizations (Chaston & Mangles, 1999).
Gruber (2004) agreed marketing is a major determinant of suc-
cess in all new firms. Marketing also is rated extremely impor-
tant by venture capitalists and Chaston (1997) found entrepre-
neurial marketing is more appropriate in smaller firms.
Entrepreneurial marketing has been suggested as most
effective when environmental change is great and resources
are limited (Becherer & Maurer, 1997). Martin’s (2009)
research also found distinctions. She compared traditional
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corporate marketing to entrepreneurial marketing and vali-
dated a framework for analysis of marketing practices specif-
ic to entrepreneurs,highlighting the differences in marketing
practices by entrepreneurs.
Traditional marketing strategies, emphasizing effective-
ness (market penetration) and efficiency, tend to dominate
when markets become more stable and firms become more
established (Morris, Schindehutte, & LaForge 2002). In con-
trast, a firm’s emphasis on entrepreneurial marketing varies
in intensity based on the stage of organizational development
and level of environmental turbulence or hostility. Firms
striking out in new directions will tend to have a greater
emphasis on the entrepreneurial marketing dimensions.
Morris, Schindehutte, and LaForge (2002) characterize
entrepreneurial marketing as an organizational orientation
having seven underlying dimensions. Four of these dimen-
sions—proactiveness, opportunity-focused, risk taking, and
innovation-oriented—build directly on research examining
the entrepreneurial orientation of the firm. Together with
customer intensity, resource leveraging, and value creation,
each dimension can be employed to a greater or lesser extent
by an SME. Each of these seven dimensions is discussed
below.
Dimensions of Entrepreneurial Marketing
Proactiveness. Proactiveness has been characterized as tak-
ing action to influence a firm’s environment (Bateman &
Crant, 1993). Involving two related marketing actions, organi-
zational proactiveness consists first of practices by which the
firm anticipates challenging situations and second, of the
actions taken to manage those events. From an entrepreneur-
ial perspective, proactivity describes marketing actions
through which the firm redefines its external conditions to
reduce uncertainty and lessen dependency and vulnerability.
Opportunity-Focused. Recognition and pursuit of oppor-
tunity are marketing actions critical to SME success. Market
potential is evaluated by the degree of fit relative to the capa-
bilities and resources of the firm. It is the ability of the firm
to select the “right” opportunity that determines success
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Hamel, 2000).
Matsuno, Metzer and Özsomer (2002) suggested an orga-
nization’s market knowledge determines whether innovation
is implemented at the appropriate time. Under less ideal cir-
cumstances, market knowledge serves as a constraint, pre-
venting the firm from squandering resources in vain. Market
knowledge allows firms to take the right action at the right
time, directing the organization toward success. Opportuni-
ties requiring substantial resource commitments may be
unattainable to smaller owner-operated firms. However, in
the SME, the recognition and pursuit of opportunity are more
closely aligned with the entrepreneur’s individual percep-
tions (Schindehutte & Morris, 2001; Forlani & Mullins, 2000;
Mullins & Forlani, 2005). Where others perceive problems,
entrepreneurs are more likely to see potential (Palich &
Bagby, 1995).
Risk Taking. Early studies of risk taking centered on the
premise that entrepreneurs are predisposed to take on risky
ventures (d’Ambroise & Muldowney, 1988).As opportunities
represent possible gains, pursuit of that gain must be tem-
pered by the potential of loss through miscalculated efforts.
Within an entrepreneurial framework, risk taking is not only
the willingness to take a chance on an opportunity, it is the
ability of the organization to use calculated actions to miti-
gate the risk inherent in opportunity pursuit. Owner-opera-
tor risk-taking attitudes play a crucial role in determining the
actions a firm undertakes, with entrepreneurs viewing risk
taking as simply part of their job (Mullins & Forlani, 2005).
Dushnitsky (2010) characterized entrepreneurs as optimistic
individuals who consciously pursue their goals. He agreed
too that these goals may often be self-serving.
While a firm’s bold market-breaking actions might be
viewed as high risk, entrepreneurs view those actions as well
within their capabilities and perceive less risk than others.
Rather than having a higher propensity for undertaking risky
ventures,entrepreneurs instead have a lower level of risk per-
ception (Palich & Bagby,1995). In a differing approach to risk
taking, an SME might choose a more incremental process and
take actions to pursue a series of smaller, less risky outcomes
(Venkatraman, 1989; Dickson & Giglierano, 1986). In their
2010 study of entrepreneurial persistence, Gompers, Kovner,
Lerner, and Scharfstein found entrepreneurs with a record of
past success are tenacious in selecting the right industry and
the right time to start new ventures. They agree entrepre-
neurs who demonstrate  market timing skills are more likely
to outperform industry peers.
Innovation-Oriented. Innovation-oriented marketing
actions allow the firm to concentrate on ideas that lead to
new markets, products or processes.The degree to which a
successful organization emphasizes innovation in its market-
ing actions can range from the highly innovative new market
creator to the incremental market builder.The market creator
must break with past solutions to offer the customer a radi-
cally different value while the incremental innovator builds
on existing customer relations and market knowledge. SMEs
may choose to focus on innovative means of marketing since
the firm may not have the resources to meet or maintain
industry standards (Carson & Gilmore, 2000).
Marcati, Guido, and Peluso (2008) found entrepreneurs
display a general innovativeness or openness to newness
and they also display a specific predisposition to be among
the first to adopt innovation within a specific domain. In a
study comparing traditional, corporate marketing to entre-
preneurial marketing, Martin (2009) found, in the case of
the entrepreneur, the marketing strategy supersedes tradi-
8 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
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tional marketing theory by the creativity, flexibility, and
innovation exhibited by the day-to-day entrepreneurs. In
their model of entrepreneurship as a solution to environ-
mental issues, York and Venkataraman (2010) found entre-
preneurs are better at addressing environmental uncertain-
ty and providing innovation.
Customer Intensity. Many studies suggested successful
organizations are those that place a greater emphasis on cus-
tomer intensity (Sheth, Sisodia & Sharma 2000; Han, Kim, &
Srivastava 1998; Hamel & Prahalad 1994; Jaworski & Kohli
1993;Narver & Slater 1990). Spence and Essoussi (2010) con-
firmed that entrepreneurs need to be aware that their public
image may reflect consumers’ perceptions of their firm.
However, it has also been suggested that extreme customer
orientations might inhibit the breakthrough innovations that
create markets and disrupt equilibrium, since these radical
changes are out in front of customers (Deshpande, Farley &
Webster, 1993). The dimension of customer intensity builds
on what is often viewed as a central driving force of market-
ing in the organization—a “customer-centric” orientation
employing innovative approaches to create,build,and sustain
customer relationships.
Resource Leveraging. The dimension of resource leverag-
ing is not simply a matter of effectively using limited
resources, but instead a creative synergistic process. In some
cases it is recognizing a resource not seen by others (Morris,
Schindehutte, & LaForge, 2002). In SMEs, instead of being
constrained by resource limitations, the firm devises an inno-
vative marketing strategy and is thus able to access resources
so more can be done with less, often mitigating risk through
a greater use of leveraging. Schindehutte and Morris (2001)
found successful SMEs were more likely to employ resource
leveraging practices such as resource sharing and outsourc-
ing of key functions. Studies found that access to resources
increases innovation and risk taking while resource con-
straints stifle entrepreneurial efforts (Hamel 2000;Prahalad &
Hamel, 1990). Conversely, studies have found resource con-
straints led to greater entrepreneurial efforts, suggesting the
entrepreneur’s perception may be more important than the
resource availability (Wiklund & Shepherd 2005;
Schindehutte & Morris 2001).
Value Creation. Value creation, central in the definition of
entrepreneurial activity, is also integral to the marketing ori-
entation of a firm (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Slater & Narver
1995;Han,Kim,& Srivastava 1998).While value creation is an
essential condition for exchange to occur, successful firms
emphasize the value creation activities best suited to their
strategic intent within their competitive niche (Miller &
Floricel, 2004).While traditional marketing has placed more
focus on the transaction and customer relationship, the focal
point of entrepreneurial marketing is innovative and is ori-
ented toward value creation (Morris, Schindehutte, &
LaForge, 2002). Entrepreneurs achieve better results when
they find new ways to create or discover value (Becherer,
Finch, & Helms, 2005/6). According to Li, Huang, and Tsai
(2009) entrepreneurial orientation is positively related to
firm performance. They further assert the knowledge cre-
ation process plays a mediating role in the relationship.
Entrepreneurial Outcomes
Outcomes for SMEs can be measured in a number of quanti-
tative ways and unlike large enterprises and corporations, the
outcomes important for the entrepreneur are often qualita-
tive.Even though traditional profit-motive outcomes are valid
for entrepreneurs, there are a host of other reasons for start-
ing a business that include being their own boss, pursuing
their own ideas, and pursuing opportunities without regard
to their current resources (Barringer & Ireland, 2010). The
entrepreneur is interested in financially oriented goals of
sales growth and increased market share and overall return
on their investment for their willingness to assume risks.
Additionally, entrepreneurs and owner/operators also meas-
ure their success in ways other than pure goal achievement.
They can focus on building a company that attains success in
many ways, such as a solid customer base or a strong compa-
ny that can sustain itself and company employees for many
years.There are also many criteria and standards to evaluate
overall company excellence as an outcome. This notion of
building an organization that would be respected for its gen-
eral excellence is an important outcome for some company
owner/operators. Lastly, personal outcomes that directly
affect the owner/operator in terms of  income, status, or an
improved standard of living are also important to consider as
the outcomes of the company directly impact the personal
outcomes for the owner/operator or entrepreneur.
Linking Entrepreneurial Marketing
Dimensions and Outcomes
The premise of this research is that entrepreneurial market-
ing is critical to the success of the SME. This investigation
examines how marketing dimensions can be linked to the
various business outcomes. Hence the following hypotheses
emerge.
Hypotheses
There are a number of ways to measure goal achievement of
the firm. One measure is how well a business performs in
terms of goals related to growth in sales revenue, profit, or
market share, as well as financial returns, goals relative to
capital investment, or equity.Thus the first two hypotheses
are
H1: Entrepreneurial marketing dimensions have a
positive effect on satisfying growth goals. 
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H2: Entrepreneurial marketing dimensions have a
positive effect on satisfying return goals.
At start-up, most entrepreneurs have a vision of the firm
they aspire to own and the various dimensions of potential
success that can be achieved. Generally, many entrepreneur-
ial firms are created to generate financial success, but often
the entrepreneur secures equal or even more satisfaction
from initiating a company that creates a loyal customer fol-
lowing or a company with a solid employee base and a good
reputation. Therefore to assess success outcomes, three dif-
ferent hypotheses are required.
H3: Entrepreneurial marketing dimensions have a
positive effect on customer success. 
H4: Entrepreneurial marketing dimensions have a
positive effect on financial success. 
H5: Entrepreneurial marketing dimensions have a
positive effect on strong company success.
Entrepreneurial owner/managers of SMEs also have per-
sonal outcome goals both for high achievement in their com-
pany and for their own personal standard of living.The long-
run viability of a firm is based on how well it creates manage-
ment practices and controls that result in an “excellent”over-
all organization with an ability to achieve sustained perform-
ance.The success of an entrepreneur or owner/ manager is
often judged by how the compensation from the venture
impacts their personal wealth and standard of living.Thus the
final two hypotheses are
H6: Entrepreneurial marketing dimensions have a
positive effect on overall company  excellence.
H7: Entrepreneurial marketing dimensions have a
positive effect on the owner/operator’s personal
standard of living.
Methodology
The Sample
Using a national mailing list, a stratified random sample was
created of 1,800 owner/operators of small to medium sized
businesses (SMEs). The sample included equal numbers of
manufacturing businesses, wholesale/distributors, retail busi-
nesses, and service businesses.The sample mailing included a
cover letter explaining the nature of the study and its
anonymity, the questionnaire, and a postage-paid return enve-
lope.Three weeks later a second complete mailing was sent
to the entire sample encouraging completion of the survey if
they had not already done so.
Completed questionnaires were received from 174
respondents for a response rate of 9.7 percent, which is typ-
ical for mail surveys.The first 25 (n=35) of the 174 respons-
es were compared with the last 20 percent (n=35) on all key
variables and no significant differences in response patterns
were identified. This would indicate that nonresponse bias
was not a problem (see Armstrong & Overton, 1977).Table 1
provides the demographics of the sample.
As indicated in the respondent profile in Table 1, the
respondents were quite diverse. Manufacturing businesses
made up 5.7 percent of the sample while retail businesses
constituted 18.4 percent of the sample. Nearly half (47.1%)
the businesses operated for 11 years or more and 10.3%  per-
cent had 31 or more employees. Most were wholesale and
distribution businesses (52.9%) and local in scope (47.1%),
although international (8.0 %) and nationally-oriented
(10.9%) businesses were represented.
Measures
Business Success (Customer, Financial and Strong
Company) Measure. Positive outcomes for small to mid-
sized enterprises can be evaluated from a number of perspec-
tives on various dimensions.To capture these multiple view-
points, using a five-point Likert-type scale, respondents were
asked to indicate their level of agreement with nine state-
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Table 1. Demographics of the Sampled Companies 
Number Percentage
Industry Category
Manufacturing
Wholesale/Distribution
Service
Retail
Other
10
92
9
32
31
5.7%
52.9%
5.2%
18.4%
17.8%
Scope of Business Operations
International
National
Regional
State-wide
Local
14
19
53
6
82
8.0%
10.9%
30.5%
3.4%
47.1%
Company Age
1-3 years
4-10 years
11-25 years
26+  years
26
66
64
18
14.9%
37.9%
36.8%
10.3%
Number of Full-Time
Employees
1-2
3-10
11-30
31+
26
66
64
18
14.9%
37.9%
36.8%
10.3%
Annual Sales
Under $100,000
100,000 – 249,000
250,000 – 999,999
1,000,000 to 4,999,999
5,000,000+
No Response/Refused
32
26
45
27
18
26
18.4%
14.9%
25.9%
15.5%
10.3%
14.9%
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ments representing aspects of business success. Items includ-
ed“successful in creating a positive reputation,”“successful in
growing sales,” and “successful in positioning the company
for long-term prosperity.”Using factor analysis, three underly-
ing success dimensions—financial success, customer satisfac-
tion success, and strong company success—emerged from
the nine variables.Table 2 shows the factor analysis that cre-
ated the “success” outcome variables.As the table shows, the
factor loadings for Customer Success are market focused and
include Create Customer Satisfaction and Create Positive
Reputation where the loadings were .918 for each measure.
The second factor, Financial Success, had five variables with
loadings ranging from .677 up to .835. The highest loading
was for the Profitability measure (.835) closely followed by
Income for the Owner (.833), and then Sales Growth (.733),
Increase Customer Base, (.698) and finally Position for Long-
Term Prosperity ( .677). The final success factor, Strong
Company Success is best characterized by Adding Good
Employees (.801) and Operates Well with/without Owner
(.752).
A Chronbach’s Alpha Coefficient was calculated for each
of the success measures. Financial Success (.86) and
Customer Success (.87) were both very high. Strong
Company Success (.54) was lower, but it was still used in this
study due to the fact that this research is exploratory.
Goal Achievement Measures. Additional outcome meas-
ures were based on self-reports of how well the company
achieved goals. Owner/operators were asked to rate how sat-
isfied they were with their company’s achievement of seven
specific goals. These seven items were also factor analyzed
and two underlying dimensions emerged.The factor matrix is
presented in Table 3. Three of the four variables with high
loadings on the Satisfaction with Return Goals emphasize
returns including Return on Investment (factor loading of
.868), Return on Equity (.826), and Return on Assets (.824).
The fourth measure is Net Profit Margin (.805). For the sec-
ond factor, Satisfaction with Growth Goals, the Growth in
Number of Employees is the strongest measure (.855 load-
ing) followed by Market Share Growth (.772) and Sales
Growth (.559).
Reliability coefficients were calculated for each of the
growth outcome measures. The Satisfaction with Return
Goals measure with four items was .70, and the Satisfaction
with Growth Goals with three items was .89. These values
indicated satisfactory reliability.
Overall Excellence Measure. The “excellence” measure is
based on a standardized outcome measure, an adaptation of
the EXCELL scale (Peters &Waterman, 1982).The original 16
attributes that characterized excellent companies that
achieved a sustainable business were adapted and opera-
tionalized by Sharma, Netemeyer and Mahajan (1990) who
created an EXCELL scale in only eight dimensions. Our study
used the condensed adaptation to accommodate the con-
straints of the questionnaire and to encourage a higher
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Table 2. Factor Analysis of Success Outcomes
Aspects of 
Business Success
Customer 
Success
Financial 
Success
Strong 
Company 
Success
1 Create Customer
Satisfaction
0.918 0.118 0.072
2 Create Positive
Reputation
0.918 0.184 0.071
3 Profitability 0.221 0.835 0.000
4 Sales Growth 0.126 0.733 0.335
5 Income for Owner 0.206 0.833 0.053
6 Increase Customer
Base
-0.008 0.698 0.365
7 Position for Long-
Term Prosperity
0.003 0.677 0.524
8 Adding Good
Employees
0.157 0.150 0.801
9 Operates Well
with/without 
Owner
-0.002 .0165 0.752
Table 3. Factor Analysis of Satisfaction with Goals
Satisfaction
with Return
GoalsCustomer 
Success
Satisfaction
with Growth
Goals
1 Return on Investment 0.868 0.221
2 Return on Equity 0.826 0.304
3 Net Profit Margin 0.805 0.132
4 Return on Assets 0.824 0.314
5 Sales Growth 0.469 0.559
6 Market Share Growth -0.318 0.772
7 Growth in Number of
Employees
0.088 0.855
Alpha 0.89 0.70
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response rate. The “excellence” outcome measure had an
alpha reliability of .71.
Personal Standard of Living Measure. From the perspec-
tive of the owner/operator, success of the business is also a
function of how the venture personally affects them.To eval-
uate this dimension, respondent owner/operators were
asked how they would describe their standard of living today
compared with their standard of living at the time they start-
ed their business. Using a five-point Likert-type scale, respon-
dents rated their standard of living from “much worse” (1),
through “about the same” (3), to “much improved” (5).
Entrepreneurial Marketing Dimension Measure. Because
of the exploratory nature of this research, the items used to
measure seven entrepreneurial marketing dimensions were
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Table 4. Entrepreneurial Marketing Dimension Measures
Proactiveness (Coefficient Alpha = .78)
• I am constantly on the lookout for new ways to improve my company.
• I am always looking for better ways to do things in my company.
• I excel at identifying opportunities for my company.
• I am great at turning problems at my company into opportunities.
• When it comes to my company, I am more action oriented than reaction oriented.
• Nothing is more exciting in my company than seeing my ideas turn into reality.
• In my company, I enjoy facing and overcoming obstacles to my ideas.
Opportunity-Focused (Coefficient Alpha = .72) 
• My management approach looks beyond current customers and markets for more opportunities for our company.
• I am good at recognizing and pursing opportunities for my company.
• I would characterize my company as opportunity driven.
• My company is always looking for new opportunities.
• My company will do whatever it takes to pursue a new opportunity.
Risk-Taking Orientation (Coefficient Alpha = .74)
• My business would rather accept a risk to pursue an opportunity than miss it altogether.
• My business is willing to take risks when we think it will benefit the company.
• My company would not be considered gamblers, but we do take risks.
Innovation-Oriented (Coefficient Alpha = .72)
• My company tries to use innovative approaches if it will help them get the job done more efficiently.
• Being innovative is a competitive advantage for my company.
• My company tends to be more innovative that most of my competitors.
• My company’s top management creates an atmosphere that encourages creativity and innovativeness.
Customer Intensity (Coefficient Alpha = .77)
• I frequently measure my company’s customer satisfaction.
• I expect that all employees in our firm recognize the importance of satisfying our customers.
• My business objectives are driven by customer satisfaction.
• I pay close attention to after-sales service.
• I encourage my employees to strive for innovative approaches to creating relationships with customers.
• I closely monitor and assess my company’s level of commitment in serving customers’ needs.
• I ensure that business strategies in my company are driven by the goals of increasing customer value.
• Sometimes, my company does not pay attention to customers who think they know more about our business than we do.
• I make sure that my company’s competitive advantage is based on understanding customers’ needs.
Resource Leveraging (Coefficient Alpha = .62)
• I have used networking and/or an exchange of favors to our advantage in my company.
• I have been able to leverage our resources by bartering or sharing.
• People who know me well would say that I am persistent, even tenacious, in overcoming obstacles.
• I use creative approaches to make things happen.
• My company prides itself on doing more with less.
• In the past, we have always found a way to get the resources we need to get the job done.
• My company has a small staff that delegates authority efficiently.
Value Creation (Coefficient Alpha = .72)
• I make sure that my company creates value for consumers with excellent customer service.
• I make sure that my company does an excellent job of creating value for customers.
• I make sure my company’s pricing structure is designed to reflect value created for customers.
• I integrate business functions in my company to better serve the target market needs.
• I make sure my managers understand how employees can contribute to value for customers.
• Providing value for our customers is the most important thing my company does.
• My company’s values are the driving force behind its operation.
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drawn both from studies that had previously examined each
dimension.Also, a series of statements was created using defi-
nitions and discussions of entrepreneurial marketing dimen-
sions. Respondents were asked to rate their agreement on a
five-point Likert-type scale with a series of statements regard-
ing the operation of their company. With limited existing
research on measures of entrepreneurial marketing dimen-
sions, validity and reliability continue to evolve.The entrepre-
neurial marketing measures utilized in this study reflect
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients from 0.55 to 0.70,
acceptable for exploratory research. Intercorrelation analysis
refined the scales to the final items presented in Table 4.
Results and Discussion
To understand the relationship between the seven entrepre-
neurial marketing dimensions and the outcome variables, a
stepwise regression was utilized. Table 5 shows the seven
stepwise regression analyses regressing the entrepreneurial
marketing dimension variables as independent variables
against each of the outcome variables as a dependent vari-
able. The extent to which each entrepreneurial marketing
variable impacts on each outcome variable is determined by
which entrepreneurial marketing dimensions significantly
enter each stepwise regression. Entrepreneurial marketing
dimensions that enter the regression contribute to explain-
ing the variance in each of the outcome variables.The entre-
preneurial marketing dimensions listed in Table 5 for each
stepwise regression are all significant and contribute to
explaining each outcome variable.
As is indicated in Table 5, the entrepreneurial marketing
dimension that has a significant and positive impact on both
Growth Goals and Return Goals is the Value Creation
Dimension (p ≤ 0.00 for both).This dimension,which reflects
the extent to which the SME focuses on providing value for
customers is the only one that directly and positively affects
achievement of growth and financial return goals. Hence,
both H1 and H2 are supported, regarding the value-driven
entrepreneurial marketing dimension.
Regarding the success related outcome variables (cus-
tomer success, financial success, and strong company suc-
cess), value creation (p ≤ 0.02) is again an entrepreneurial
marketing dimension that significantly and positively affects
each aspect of success. Relative to the specific success out-
come variables, as would be expected, customer intensity (p
≤ 0.03) positively and significantly affects the customer-suc-
cess outcome variable. Regarding financial success as an out-
come, in addition to the value creation entrepreneurial mar-
keting dimension (p ≤ 0.00), risk taking (p ≤ 0.00) also is pos-
itively and significantly related. Relative to “strong company
success,” innovativeness (p ≤ 0.01) and leveraging (p ≤ 0.04)
are the two entrepreneurial marketing dimensions, along
with value-creation (p ≤ 0.00), that have a significant and pos-
itive impact on this success outcome.While it is interesting
that value-creation impacts all three aspects of success, it is
intuitive that risk taking has a positive and significant effect
on financial success while customer intensity is directly relat-
ed to customer success. Relative to building a strong compa-
ny, among these respondent SME’s, it is interesting being
innovative and leveraging resources, along with being value
creation driven are the variables that have a significant
impact on building a strong company.Hence there is support
for H3,H4 and H5 relative to specific entrepreneurial market-
ing dimensions for each.
Regarding the excellence outcome measure, several entre-
preneurial marketing dimensions relate both directly and sig-
nificantly to this outcome.The four dimensions that demon-
strated this relationship are value-creation, (p ≤ 0.00), proac-
tiveness (p ≤ 0.00), innovation-oriented (p ≤ 0.00), and cus-
tomer intensity (p ≤ 0.00). It is interesting that again the
value creation dimension is important. Providing value to
customers as a priority is related to creating an excellent
company along with being proactive in marketing, seeking
opportunities, and being innovative and maintaining a cus-
tomer focus. Based on the above analysis, H6 is supported
with four entrepreneurial marketing dimensions having a
positive and significant effect on overall company excel-
lence.
The entrepreneur’s personal standard of living is an
important outcome and an important reason for becoming
an entrepreneur or owner/operator.The entrepreneurial mar-
keting dimension that has a positive and significant effect on
the entrepreneur's personal standard of living is their risk-
taking orientation (p ≤ 0.01).This supports the well-known
axiom that entrepreneurs are willing to assume risk in order
to achieve a reward. Therefore H7 is supported, suggesting
perhaps that risk taking is a quality that entrepreneurs must
possess as compared to managers and other professions.
Of interest is the fact that opportunity focused as an entre-
preneurial marketing dimension did not significantly impact
any of the outcome measures in the study. So while six of the
seven entrepreneurial marketing dimensions directly and
positively affected outcome variables in the SMEs included in
this research, opportunity focused did not have a similar
effect. It may be that other outcome variables such as open-
ing new markets or finding new customer segments would
be directly impacted by the opportunity focused dimensions.
Similarly, opportunity focused may relate better to SMEs clos-
er to start-up in their life-cycle as compared to more estab-
lished companies.
It is also of interest that while six of the seven entrepre-
neurial marketing variables had significant impacts on out-
come variables, only the “excellence outcome” with the four
independent entrepreneurial marketing dimensions (value
creation, proactiveness, innovation-oriented, and customer
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intensity) had a large R2 of 0.66.The R2s for other outcome
variable entrepreneurial marketing dimension relationships
ranged from 0.04 to 0.25.The high R2 for the excellence out-
come variable may also reflect that more entrepreneurial
marketing outcome variables were significantly related to
excellence.Thus additional significant variables in the regres-
sion equation may inflate the R2.
Conclusions
Based on the results of this research, it would appear entre-
preneurial marketing dimensions directly and positively
influence outcomes related to owner-operated SMEs. The
value-creation dimension stands out as an aspect of entrepre-
neurial marketing that affects not only financial performance
but also growth, customer success, and generally building a
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Table 5. Stepwise Regression Analyses of Entrepreneurial Marketing 
on Outcome Variables
Dependent Variable: Satisfied Growth Goals
R2 = .07; F = 12.09; Sig = .00
Entrepreneurial Dimension
Entered Beta t Significance
Value Creation 0.271 3.48 0.00
Dependent Variable: Satisfied Return Goals
R2 = .06; F = 10.07; Sig = .00
Entrepreneurial Dimension
Entered Beta t Significance
Value Creation 0.249 3.17 0.00
Dependent Variable: Customer Success
R2 = .20; F = 19.77; Sig = .00
Entrepreneurial Dimension
Entered Beta t Significance
Value Creation 0.256 2.40 0.02
Customer Intensity 0.228 2.14 0.03
Dependent Variable: Financial Success
R2 = .25; F = 30.99; Sig = .00
Entrepreneurial Dimension
Entered Beta t Significance
Value Creation 0.310 4.20 0.00
Risk Taking 0.303 4.10 0.00
Dependent Variable: Strong Company Success
R2 = .21; F = 13.38; Sig = .00
Entrepreneurial Dimension
Entered Beta t Significance
Value Creation 0.342 3.77 0.00
Innovation-Oriented 0.241 2.63 0.01
Resource Leveraging 0.173 2.06 0.04
Dependent Variable: Excellence
R2 = .66; F = 71.93; Sig = .00
Entrepreneurial Dimension
Entered Beta t Significance
Value Creation 0.303 3.59 0.00
Proactiveness 0.229 3.51 0.00
Innovation-Oriented 0.214 3.39 0.00
Customer Intensity 0.231 3.12 0.00
Dependent Variable: Personal Standard of Living
R2 = .04; F = 8.18; Sig = .01
Entrepreneurial Dimension
Entered Beta t Significance
Risk Taking 0.223 2.86 0.01
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strong sustainable company. Other dimensions relate specifi-
cally to outcomes—risk taking related to financial success,
customer intensity relating to customer success, and being
innovative and leveraging resources to building a strong com-
pany. The use of entrepreneurial marketing in an SME can
influence goal attainment on a personal level for the
owner/operator and for the company. Entrepreneurial mar-
keting also relates positively to creating a strong company as
reflected by building a good employee base, creating a stand-
alone business that can operate with or without the owner,
and creating a culture of innovation and efficiency that can
quickly respond to problems and support both customers
and employees in a positive manner.
While all seven entrepreneurial marketing dimensions do
not relate to all outcome variables, this research demon-
strates that alone or in combination entrepreneurial market-
ing can affect positive outcomes.As it becomes more difficult
to develop effective strategies, entrepreneurial marketing
activities should continue to be investigated.
Areas for Future Research
Over the life cycle of the firm, there may be differences in
how important entrepreneurial marketing is in strategy for-
mation and how it is applied. By comparing SMEs with large
corporations, it might be possible to determine which of the
entrepreneurial marketing dimensions are actually more
entrepreneurial and which are associated with general mar-
keting tasks of all organizations.Also, looking more closely at
the demographics, such as company age and industry catego-
ry, may show how entrepreneurial marketing  impacts per-
formance outcomes.
Similarly with the importance of nonprofit organizations
in our economy, it would be insightful to undertake a similar
investigation among such organizations to see if they would
have similar benefits to entrepreneurial activity. Variables
such as leveraging and proactively might be key aspects of
marketing activities in nonprofits as they often have critical
resource constraints. Likewise, studying SMEs in key industry
classifications or scope of business operations (from local to
international) may reveal unique entrepreneurial marketing
effects on outcomes. While this is exploratory research, the
findings point to interesting relationships between entrepre-
neurial marketing and business and personal outcomes.
Further research should utilize additional methodologies
including in-depth interviews to identify unique aspects of
entrepreneurial marketing that have particularly strong link-
ages to positive organization or entrepreneur success and
raise new variables for further investigation.
Interestingly, there was no support for the link between
entrepreneurial marketing and the opportunity focused com-
ponent of new venture creation. Further research should
attempt to isolate this proposed linkage and determine how
the opportunity focused motive of entrepreneurs impacts
entrepreneurial marketing. By studying only SMEs in opera-
tion for three years or less, it may be possible to isolate the
impact of the opportunity-focused entrepreneurial market-
ing dimension.Again, this research is specifically focused on
one aspect of companies that have sales under $5 million
annually and a limited number of businesses that are interna-
tionally-oriented in scope. Companies that are larger and
have a more global focus may utilize entrepreneurial market-
ing in other ways and additional variables may emerge when
such firms with a larger customer base are studied.By explor-
ing companies with a more diverse demographic profile,
additional dimensions may also emerge regarding the role of
entrepreneurial marketing and outcomes in SMEs.
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Many entrepreneurial firms risk falling into a cashflow “Valley of Death”—the stage of a youngfirm’s life when seed funding is running dry but
the firm has yet to secure sufficient additional funding to
carry it through to product commercialization.This is par-
ticularly true in the nascent cleantech sector, where invest-
ments are often complex and capital intensive.Drawing on
an in-depth interview with seasoned entrepreneur Brian
Cunningham, CEO of the Wave Energy Conversion
Corporation of America, this article explores the role of per-
sistence in entrepreneurship, distinguishing between “cal-
culated” and “blind” persistence.
Keywords: entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial traits
Worldwide almost $2 billion was invested in the Q1 2010 in
companies working on renewable energy and efficiency
projects—a figure approaching the level of the boom times
before the financial crisis hit. However, this number is
skewed by a large infusion of capital from government stim-
ulus programs (Gelles and Waters, 2010). These funds were
given to a relatively small number of projects. In the United
States, for example, the ARPA-E (Advanced Research Projects
Agency-Energy) program, which supports very early stage
technologies, allocated its first round of grants totaling $151
million to just 37 projects, out of a pool of 3,600 applicants.
Of the remaining 3,563 candidates, those most likely to be
funded in this difficult environment are not big,complex,and
capital-intensive power generation projects such as wind
power, but efficiency companies that do more with less.This
leaves the majority of firms in danger of falling into the
“Valley of Death”—the stage of a young firm’s life when seed
funding is running dry but the firm has yet to secure suffi-
cient additional funding to carry it through to product com-
mercialization. According to Gompers and Lerner (2001, p.
21):“Ninety percent of new entrepreneurial businesses that
don’t attract venture capital fail within three years.”What is
it about the remaining 10 percent that enables them to
endure beyond three years? We sought insight into this ques-
tion by speaking with Brian Cunningham, CEO of the Wave
Energy Conversion Corporation of America (WECCA), a nas-
cent cleantech company that has failed to obtain funding for
a second-generation prototype for more than five years, yet
so far has managed to cheat death. According to
Cunningham, the key to beating the odds is calculated per-
sistence—a term we shall revisit later in this article. Leading
thinkers have long extolled the virtue of persistence in any
realm of life.
• “Permanence, perseverance and persistence in spite of
all obstacles, discouragement, and impossibilities: It is
this, that in all things distinguishes the strong soul from
the weak.”—Thomas Carlyle.
• “No great achievement is possible without persistent
work.”—Bertrand Russell.
• “Let me tell you the secret that has led me to my goal:my
strength lies solely in my tenacity.”—Louis Pasteur.
• “Many of life’s failures are people who did not realize
how close they were to success when they gave up.”—
Thomas Edison.
• “Never give in—never, never, never, never, in nothing
great or small, large or petty, never give in except to con-
victions of honour and good sense.”—Winston Churchill.
Persistence is also thought to be essential to business suc-
cess, so much so that the Oxford Dictionary’s definition of
the term supplies the following example: companies must
have patience and persistence, but the rewards are there.Wu
et al. (2007) found that the need for achievement is positive-
ly related to persistence, but surprisingly, few studies have
directly addressed the role of persistence in entrepreneur-
ship. Analysis of in-depth interviews with seasoned CEOs
such as Cunningham may yield greater insights into the role
of persistence in entrepreneurial survival. The article pro-
ceeds as follows. First, we provide a brief biography of the
entrepreneur, along with essential information about the
industry and WECCA’s technology.This is followed by a tran-
script of one of a series of interviews with Cunningham con-
ducted since early 2010.The final section discusses the main
findings and limitations of this study, as well as some promis-
ing avenues for research.
Biography of the Entrepreneur
Brian Cunningham began his career as a physicist at the
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Naval Ordnance Lab, and then became a project manager at
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, where
he designed, fabricated and helped launch scientific satel-
lites for America’s lunar program. He left the public sector to
found the high-tech firm Computer Entry Systems
Corporation (CES) in 1968, which went on to design, manu-
facture, and sell hardware and software for processing bills
for such institutions as National Geographic, C&P
Telephone, and Riggs National Bank. The firm, which had
sales of $78 million in 1987, controlled 40 percent of the
niche market known as “remittance processing.”As chairman
and CEO,he guided CES from its inception through a 12-year
private and an 8-year public journey, eventually employing
more than 1,000 associates and returning over 30 times the
original investment of the founding investors. CES was rec-
ognized by both Forbes and Inc. magazines as one of the
fastest growing small companies in the United States, and
was increasingly profitable for 16 consecutive years. In
1989, CES was sold to BancTec for $45 million in cash
(Walsh, 1988). In 2001, Cunningham founded
Entrepreneurial Advocates, Inc. (EAI), a Maryland-based spe-
cialized mentoring service for local entrepreneurs, concur-
rently volunteering with the Entrepreneur-ship Partnership of
Greater Washington.
In 2004, Cunningham met Dr. Michael McCormick, a pro-
fessor at the U.S. Naval Academy, at their 50th high school
reunion.1 McCormick told him about a wave-energy technol-
ogy he’d been developing in collaboration with civil engi-
neer Peter McCabe (whom McCormick had met at a wave-
energy conference back in 1980), which could produce
either electricity or potable water (through desalination).
Impressed with the comparative simplicity of the design,
McCormick designed, built, and tested a model of the so-
called “McCabe wave pump” (MWP), the results of which
paved the way for a prototyping program. However, while
the prototype proved the principle of converting waves to
mechanical energy, this energy had not yet been harnessed
to produce the marketable commodities of electricity or
water.2 After an investment of several million dollars, the
project ran out of money and needed the help of a seasoned
executive to get it back on track. Cunningham was thus
hired as CEO.
The McCabe Wave Pump
The principle of the MWP is to harness the pitch motion of
the waves to produce mechanical energy.The device consists
of three pontoons hinged together, aligned with buoys and
anchor chains so the MWP faces incoming waves head on
(Figure 1).The three pontoons move relative to one another
in the waves, but the center inertial pontoon is restricted in
its motion by an underwater horizontal plate. Energy is
extracted from the rotation about the hinge points by
hydraulic pumps mounted at the center.This energy can be
used either to create electricity (by driving a generator) or
potable water (by pumping water into a reverse osmosis
desalinator). Issued in 1992, the original patent focused only
on the production of potable water, which was perceived to
be the application with the greatest need and value.
In Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power and
Civilization, the journalist Steven Solomon argues that water
is surpassing oil as the world’s scarcest critical resource
(National Public Radio 2010). Almost 1 billion people lack
access to safe water supplies, but less than 1 percent of the
world’s fresh water (or about 0.007% of all water on earth) is
readily accessible for direct human use. While tapping
aquifers provides short-term relief, the long-term solution
must include desalination, especially in light of the fact that
by 2030, the world will use 40 percent more water than
today.Conventional fossil fuel-powered methods for desalina-
tion are expensive because they are energy-intensive
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Figure 1. The McCabe Wave Pump
Source: Polaski (2003)
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(indeed, energy consumption can account for as much as
one-third the total cost of the water produced), whereas the
MWP could obtain that power for free.
In 1996, a 40m long, 140-kilowatt prototype MWP began
testing near Kilbaha in southwest Ireland. However, after sev-
eral months of operation, the hydraulic pipes burst under
pressure from strong waves. Clearly, higher capacity
hydraulics was needed, but more importantly, the engineers
realized there was enough power in the waves to desalinate
seawater directly,without the intermediate step of producing
electricity.
McCormick and his colleagues compared the prototype
test results with those obtained from computer models of
the MWP under theoretical conditions. The test results
proved consistent with these models. Specifically, operating
in its “design sea” (average wave height of 1.5 meters and an
average period of 7.5 seconds), the MWP was calculated to
be capable of pumping about 275,000 cubic meters per year
of filtered salt water (supply water), or about 750 cubic
meters per day (0.0087 cubic meters/second) at an average
operational pressure of 70 bar (McCormick 2001). Ongoing
sea trials led to further technological refinements.The ocean
environment is arduous, and therefore, it was necessary to
improve efficiency, robustness, and performance. In 2006,
McCormick filed a patent (issued in 2009) for a hydraulic
method for increasing the pitching angle of the center barge.
Meanwhile, further design changes were made to enable
electricity production as well as potable water production,
and ensure dependable operation in harsher conditions. It is
calculated that in average 2.5m high/8.5 second waves, each
unit (now called a “Wave Energy Converter” or WEC) will be
capable of supplying 500KW of electricity to the local grid
for $0.07-0.09/KWhr.
The oceans of the world contain as much as 10 trillion
watts of renewable energy. Europe’s accessible wave-energy
resource alone is calculated to be about 320,000 MW
(megawatt),with the highest resource available near the west
coast of Ireland. All of the energy is concentrated near the
water surface, making wave power a highly concentrated
energy source with much smaller hourly and day-to-day vari-
ations than certain other renewable resources, such as wind
or solar. Indeed, the energy density of wave energy is 14
times that of wind energy and 8 times that of solar energy.
The next phase of the project is to conduct a quarter-scale
model study of the next-generation WEC at the test site pro-
vided by Sustainable Energy Ireland (SEI) in Galway Bay,
which will produce electricity and potable water. This will
pave the way for a full-scale prototype to be deployed at the
Irish Wave Energy Demonstration Site off Belmullet, County
Mayo, for the purpose of generating up to 12 MWh
(megawatt hour)/day. To guarantee financial return for
investors in wave-energy projects, the Irish government is
offering £220/MWh energy produced for a period of 15 years
(this compares to £66/MWh for wind projects).The goal is to
meet the soaring demand for energy, while also reducing
reliance on costly imported fuels and meeting the European
Union emissions mandate (increase the share of renewables
in EU energy use to 20% by 2020). Currently renewables
make up about 13 percent of Ireland’s total energy output.
In late January 2010, Cunningham visited Ireland to meet
with government officials, energy suppliers, contractors, ven-
ture capitalist, and other parties. Upon his return we con-
ducted the following interview, which had two main objec-
tives: (1) to obtain his assessment of the trip in light of objec-
tives, and (2) to draw out the relevant business principles, so
that we may gain new insights into the qualities that set “sur-
vivors” apart.
February 2010 Interview with Cunningham
[Note: WECCA was formerly called Ocean Energy Systems
(OES)]
Q: Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about
Ocean Energy Systems.3 We’re interested not only in the facts
of this case, but also in the underlying business principles—
the important lessons learned through experience that our
readers can take away and apply in their own careers.You’ve
just returned from an important business trip to Ireland and
you gave it a B+.We’d call that “very good.”What does “very
good” mean in your eyes, and what would a “straight A” have
looked like?
Cunningham: To begin with, it’s important to realize that
any entrepreneur must seek out the pain. Go to where the
pain is, and you will have a much higher probability of get-
ting the result you want.For example, Ireland signed both the
Kyoto and EU treaties a number of years ago and the Kyoto
Treaty particularly calls for them paying fines for excessive
emissions beyond 2011.They’re 176 percent off what their
1990 emissions were. If they don’t get their emissions down,
they’re going to be paying big fines, and everybody we met
in Ireland, from taxi drivers to the minister of energy, told us
of the necessity to address this. So I feel we’re really going
where the pain is. Now let me take you through the trip. Our
objectives were fourfold.
First, we wanted to solidify our relationship with
Sustainable Energy Ireland.They’re the people who are going
to put up half of the money for the prototype development,
which will begin with a quarter scale model in Galway Bay.
And once we pass that, we’ll go to Belmullet, where the
ocean is heavy, and produce electricity, which will be deliv-
ered to the grid.This will all happen over a two- or three-year
period—two years for the prototype,and a year or two there-
after to start production of full-scale units. I’m looking for
about $5 million in matching funds for the next phase of the
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prototype,and a total of $10 to $20 million to make this com-
pany entirely profitable on a cash-flow basis.But the first step
is to solidify our relationship with Ireland.
The second step was to locate a production crew or com-
pany in Ireland that can make the Wave Energy Converters.
To qualify for Irish funding, we have to produce the units in
Ireland.We found a good candidate in Bear Island Boatyard,
because they have the right size dry dock and the right size
organization. So, that was the second step.
Thirdly, I needed to find that other 50 percent of the
money, and that would come from venture capitalists. And
since Ireland is closer to the problem and more committed to
the solution, venture capitalists tend to be more interested
over there.
And lastly, I wanted to find a customer who was willing to
give me a letter of intent to buy power from us at a certain
price over a certain period.
Right off the plane, my colleague Dan Morley and I met
with Sustainable Energy Ireland at a local hotel.These were
the senior people at SEI who were going to carry our applica-
tion forward to the review committee. We had submitted a
preliminary application in October 2009.We were anxious to
sit with them face to face,what I call “knee touching,”to make
sure that we were reading them correctly,and it couldn’t have
been more cordial and positive.They’re very interested in us
as a project.They want to do it, and we just have to find some-
body to provide the other 50 percent of the investment
money required to move us forward with the prototype.
The next thing we did was meet with a potential customer
who could buy the power output.The reason for this is sim-
ple: if you can show a venture capitalist a customer who’s
going to buy your product, then you’re on much safer ground,
because the venture capitalist is trying to constantly reduce
his risk. In any event, after we met with Energia, the largest
independent energy supplier in Ireland,they agreed to give us
a letter of intent to buy all of the power we can produce for
220 euros per MWh.That’s $308 dollars in U.S. currency, and
we can produce that power, we believe, for about $67 a
MWh—that’s about 54 euros—so they’re going to pay us 220
euros for what we can produce for 54 euros and they’ll do it
over a period of 15 years, taking all of the energy we can pro-
duce.Now,this is subject to terms and conditions as yet unde-
fined, but these should not be hard for us to meet. So we
achieved our second objective in getting a letter that we
could present to venture capitalists and other investors.
The third thing we did was talk to some venture capitalist
firms, and while they didn’t commit to invest, they were very
interested in our proposition. And if we could meet certain
conditions, then they might well invest—conditions that
involve tank tests, either in Ireland or the United States, to
demonstrate that we could actually produce power. Because
even though we’ve been testing a prototype off the coast of
Ireland over a nine-year period, nobody has ever produced
either a watt of electricity or an ounce of water, so they want-
ed to see that could really be done.As a physicist, and that’s
my background, I am convinced that this can be done,
because once you have the energy, you can do with it what
you will. Still, some of the venture capitalists are not as tech-
nically minded, so they want more tangible proof.
Another venture capitalist firm that we talked to told us:
“Look, we’re funded by an employment organization here in
Ireland and you have to convince them that you can produce
the jobs.” We can produce an estimated 220 jobs for every
hundred WEC units we produce per year. If you do a thousand
units, that means you’ve got a 2,220 people on the payroll.
They liked that a lot.But we still have more selling work to do,
because we only had a week in Ireland and some of the peo-
ple we wanted to meet were not available.
The last thing we wanted to do was find a customer to buy
actual WEC units from us, as opposed to power. That might
well be the Electricity Supply Board in Ireland, who recently
announced in Ireland’s Independent newspaper there that
they are going to put 150 MWs of wave power off the Irish
coast by 2020. Well, that gives us enough time, since this is
now 2010, to get up and running and it would take 300 of our
units to do that, so it’s a natural. Our contact at the Electricity
Supply Board told us he had no real candidate supplier at
present and would love to work with us.
Q: Luke Johnson, who writes about entrepreneurship for the
Financial Times, recently said that a reliable gut feeling is
what separates winners from losers. In fact, he says it’s the
most valuable emotional tool that any entrepreneur can pos-
sess and I wanted to ask you how much weight you put on
this “sixth sense.”
Cunningham:He’s exactly correct. I don’t think we’re neces-
sarily born with this instinct.You have to make an awful lot
of mistakes in order to perfect your ability to pick it up, and
as I’ve said in previous discussions with you, it helps to have
made 98 percent of the mistakes one can make in the busi-
ness world. I can sense how things are going as soon as I go
and see a customer. I must address his or her pain as soon as
possible, or it’s not going to work out for either of us. So
again, my answer is to find the pain, and address that pain
whether it’s in an individual conversation or a sales presenta-
tion or whatever.
Q:What implications does this have for our graduates? What
advice would you give those considering beginning their
own ventures?
Cunningham: I would think they should first prepare a busi-
ness plan, take it to the market, and let the market beat them
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up a bit.Then come back and sort out what direction they
should take. But perhaps one of the best sources of advice
that they can get is from old veteran entrepreneurs who real-
ly enjoy getting back in the fray of things by answering ques-
tions for these folks. I didn’t have the benefit of mentors. I did
have a board of directors, but nobody who really wanted to
mentor me, and that was a problem.A mentor can make an
unbelievably positive contribution to an entrepreneur’s suc-
cess. They’ll take stock for it, or maybe they’ll just give the
time away to you, because they want to help people, as I do
myself. Entrepreneurship is so important.You should under-
stand that 98 percent of net new jobs in the U.S. economy
come from companies of 20 or less.
Q: I’d like to turn our attention to commercialization.The suc-
cess of OES rests largely on a distributive partnership model.
Can you explain how that model would work in practice?
Cunningham:The Wave Energy Converters each weigh 160
tons, and as such, should be built in locales where they’re
going to be deployed.To do that,one needs to have local part-
ners, so I’ve been out searching for partners all over the
world who have dry docks, have a desire to build these units
and make a profit off the electricity, the water, or sea salt
[byproduct of desalination].The way the partnership would
work is that we would provide technology—both current
technology and ongoing technology—in wave energy, and
they would do the building on site, supplying jobs to people.
They would also deliver and maintain the product at sea.We
would get 60 percent of the profits, because we would own
60 percent of the venture,while our local partners would get
40 percent.
Q:The principle here is to make sure that all the parties have
skin in the game.
Cunningham:Yes, skin in the game is important to any deal.
You can sometimes win without it, but the principle is, get
everybody with skin in the game whenever you can. And
above all, never give up.
Q: In your business plan you’ve projected that your joint ven-
ture partners will make 17.3 times their original investment,
or a compound rate of return of 21 percent over a 15-year
period. Some may call that quite optimistic.
Cunningham: Often projections are overly optimistic. In this
particular case,we have a government who is committed and
is willing to buy all the power we can produce to subsidize
companies like Energia at 220 euros a MWh.That’s an unusu-
al condition when you have a guaranteed price to be paid
over 15 years, so my projections really are much less ques-
tionable than is normally the case, because the minister of
energy, whom we also met in Ireland during our trip, con-
firmed that they are willing to do it and he’s gone to press
with that information. It’s not rocket science. It’s a matter of
good engineering and providing good maintenance and good
operations.
Q: You have your projections covered and you have them
grounded in some pretty solid facts.One of the other areas of
interest to prospective investors would be intellectual prop-
erty. Can you tell us where things stand on that front?
Cunningham: IP is very important and should be considered
by any entrepreneur right up front, because it takes a long
time to get a patent—maybe two or three years, but as long
as you’ve applied for one, or been qualified to apply for one,
at least you’re on the right track. We have applied for two
patents, have a third in hand, and after we get funded, we’re
going to paper our device with patents to protect us and our
joint venture partners around the world from theft of the
intellectual property.
Q: Looking over your critical agenda, it’s very clear that you’re
thinking strategically.Already, you’re thinking about the next
phase of financing post-prototype, funding and developing
the next generation of wave-energy products, and building a
successor team to make OES into a global force in the renew-
able space.Can you elaborate on the business principle here?
Cunningham: Somebody in the company always has to be
looking out 5, 10, and perhaps even 20 years if you want to
get to somewhere, similar to getting to a place on a map.
You’re lost if you don’t know where you’re going, if you can’t
point out the place on the map where you’re headed, then
you can’t figure out the alternative means of getting there.
Although unlike an actual geographical map, which is pretty
constant, ours is a dynamic environment that requires many
different kinds of resources—physical, intellectual, emotional
and spiritual, as well as financial.
Q:Yes, and at the same time, I think the principle here is that
adaptability really must be the mantra of any entrepreneur.
Cunningham: Exactly right.You must provide for adaptabili-
ty by saying,“What if this happens”or “What if that happens,”
and “What am I going to do?”You won’t be able to predict the
exact environment you’ll be in, but set your mind to a flexi-
ble condition so that you know how to deal with undula-
tions. In fact, some of the greatest inventions of all time have
emerged because people have been willing to adapt to situa-
tions that were unexpected.
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Q: Looking ahead, you intend to diversify from power into
water.What’s the principle behind this diversification strategy?
Cunningham: Water was the original objective because
water is more important to mankind than electricity.Water is
the end game and our specific device produces water more
efficiently than it does electricity, except for in Ireland and
certain other locations. But these are the exceptions. So in a
sense, electricity is a diversification taking into account
where the market is right now, but eventually it’ll come back
to water and we will be producing 250,000 gallons per day
in one- and half-meter waves.
Q:Water is not the only area you will be venturing into. Sea
salt is a byproduct of the desalinization process and is some-
thing you’ve been looking into.
Cunningham:When you desalinate water, 250,000 gallons a
day that is, you end up with 50,000 pounds of salt, which I
originally thought was something we had to get rid of respon-
sibly. But as I looked into it, I found out that sea salt, unlike
mineral salt that you find on land, has a much higher nutrient
content. I know a farmer out in Missouri who has a thousand
acres and he raises his crops on sea salt, which contains 81
nutrients. I have pictures of sibling pigs, one twice the size of
the other, one raised on sea salt, the other raised on PNK—
these are the standard elements within fertilizer—potassium,
nitrogen, and phosphorus.The world usage of fertilizer is 160
million tons a year.Well, I could produce 50,000 pounds of sea
salt every day from one WEC unit.There’s a tremendous mar-
ket for sea salt, not only for agriculture but also direct human
consumption. Campbell Soup, as an example, has adopted sea
salt because it has these other nutrients in it. So, this was a fall
out,a byproduct of our work,but it deserves exhaustive inves-
tigation and perhaps even commercialization.
Q:You’ve talked about the need to gain the support of poli-
cymakers and it’s clear that you’ve accomplished that in
Ireland. I want to turn our attention to the situation in the
United States. Is there the political will here in the United
States? I noticed that President Obama recently pledged $8
billion for new nuclear reactors and stressed the need to
invest in other carbon-neutral energy technologies, but it
seems that wave energy isn’t even on the radar here.
Cunningham: You’re right. That’s a big problem we have.
Wave energy is not on anybody’s radar screen because I
believe that while it’s interesting and intriguing, there is no
commercially successful industry at this point. There are an
awful lot of dabblers out there who are trying to make a go of
it,but when they go to raise money like I’ve been trying to do
since 2004 from venture capitalists or foundations or anybody
else, they run into obstacles.These people—that is, the suppli-
ers of the money—are responsible to other folks for the
money that they have and they don’t want to look foolish.
When there’s no industry out there, they’re wondering:‘Even
if this company is successful, where are we going to sell the
company to get the rich return we deserve for backing this
venture?’The industry doesn’t yet exist.And I believe it’s one
of government’s jobs to help create industry, so I’ve been
working with SEI in Ireland and they’re certainly on to it.
They’re ahead of me, actually.
Congressman Jay Inslee of Seattle, Washington, has put
forth a bill for $250 million a year for 11 years to be spent on
the development of wave-energy industry. Once the industry
is up and running, we’ll all be able to get money a lot more
easily,but right now it’s very,very difficult. I believe that a ris-
ing tide lifts all boats, but with no industry out there, you
have no tide to reference,and that’s what’s made this journey
particularly arduous for Ocean Energy Systems. But I have
retained the willingness to “never give up” and sooner or
later, I’m going to crack this thing.
Q: It doesn’t help your case that the information being pub-
lished about wave energy does not really correspond with
the data that you have in hand.The Wall Street Journal quot-
ed some data from Bloomberg New Energy Finance saying
that as of the fourth quarter of 2009, wave energy is actually
the most expensive energy source when you take subsidies
out of the equation and I think they were comparing to coal,
natural gas, biomass, solar onshore/offshore wind, biomass,
geothermal, and some others. They said that wave energy
costs between $250 and $500 per MWh to produce,with the
likeliest cost being about $375 a MWh. Now, how does that
compare with the data that you have in hand? What do you
think you can produce it for? 
Cunningham: It’s the perception that counts. Right now, the
world perceives wave energy as too dangerous for us to deal
with.We believe that we can produce this energy for $67 a
MWh,not $375 as you’re suggesting.That’s about a fifth of the
current estimate. Breaking that barrier and the world will
realize that we don’t need fossil fuel energy, just as it came to
believe it didn’t need IBM 360s. But we’re going to have to
prove it first.
Q: How does your experience working with OES as CEO
compare with your experience as a CEO of the public com-
puter company that you built and ran, Computer Entry
Systems?
Cunningham: Administratively it’s very similar in that you
need the best quality of people you can get to do the job. On
the other hand, the fundraising has been extremely difficult,
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as I said. You might think that a computer company would
have more difficulty raising money than a wave-energy com-
pany, but that’s not the case, because when I began as a fledg-
ing entrepreneur, 28 years old, trying to raise money, took my
first business plan to Wall Street, at least I was in an industry
that existed. IBM and NCR Burroughs and many others were
making a lot of money in it, and all I had to do was find some
niche application or IP-protected product that would perform
20 percent better than the other offerings.Venture capitalists
are easily able to discern whether that’s feasible or not, and I
won on that basis. But when you don’t have an industry to
compare against, no reference point that is, it’s much harder
because they say to themselves, as I said earlier in this inter-
view, even if he does make it, where am I going to sell this
company in 5 or 10 years, since there is no industry currently
in existence. Remember, these people are out trying to raise
money for their next fund and they have to show they were
diligent in choosing and managing their existing funds.
Discussion
Cunningham sums up his philosophy this way:“If you can sur-
vive, you can thrive.” But crucially, he distinguishes between
“blind persistence” and “calculated persistence.” Blind persist-
ence (persistence for its own sake) may produce results, but
only in exceptional cases,and usually with a great deal of luck.
Calculated persistence is grounded in sound business judg-
ment,beginning with thoroughly researched and “vetted”busi-
ness plans and value propositions. For example, all the persist-
ence in the world is unlikely to bear fruit unless the entrepre-
neur “goes where the pain is greatest” (i.e. where there is a
demonstrable market need for the product or service and
where funds are available to pay for the proposed solution).
Similarly, persistence in fundraising is far more likely to pro-
duce results if market-sensitive investors can be shown some-
thing more than just a good idea. Proof of concept (however
preliminary) and a letter of intent from a customer helps, as
does a clear and compelling strategy and exit strategy.At the
same time, reasonable flexibility is a must. Driving a singular
view of strategy out of sheer stubbornness is a recipe for dis-
aster. Also, cultivating enduring business relationships takes
more than persistent effort: business partners must also be
properly managed and incentivized.
Importantly, says Cunningham,calculated persistence is not
just a matter of analysis, but also reliable gut feeling, built up
through years of commercial experience. As Johnson (2010)
pointed out, at critical points in the life of a venture, decisions
have to be taken without all the facts on hand.Combined with
the confidence that comes with a successful track record, this
“sixth sense” enables the entrepreneur to carry others with
them, even though they cannot necessarily provide concrete
evidence that they are right. “If you are to launch projects
before others, invent new products or seize opportunities
ahead of the pack,”says Johnson,“you must be willing to act—
at least in part—on a hunch.” In situations where a team lacks
the requisite first-hand experience, deficiencies can be offset
in large part by bringing in the right partners and mentors.A
number of studies have confirmed the value of mentorship in
entrepreneurship (see for example Sullivan, 2000; Cull, 2006;
Deakins et al. 1997;Taylor et al. 2004; Bisk, 2002). Cunningham
would argue that even the most experienced entrepreneurs
need mentors of their own, whose job is to challenge assump-
tions systematically through “constructive dissention,” forcing
the entrepreneur to think properly through their decisions.
At the time of writing, Cunningham’s company remains
stuck in the Valley of Death, although he is upbeat about its
near-term prospects for funding. Further interviews with
Cunningham may yield hypotheses about the relationship
between persistence and survival in entrepreneurship that
may be tested in larger scale longitudinal studies involving
multiple entrepreneurs.Additional research is required to iden-
tify the elements of calculated persistence (analytical, intuitive,
other), where they reside (executive team, board of directors,
professional firms, financiers, and so on), and how they are
best assembled in a new firm.Also of interest is the relation-
ship between “calculated persistence” and “performance per-
sistence” (the idea that success breeds success).According to
Gompers and Lerner, entrepreneurs with a successful track
record had a 34 percent chance of succeeding in their next
venture-backed firm,compared with 23 percent for those who
previously failed and 22 percent for first-timers. Common
sense would suggest that calculated persistence and perform-
ance persistence are related.
Conclusion
Ninety percent of new entrepreneurial businesses that are
not able to attract venture capital fail within three years.
Drawing on an in-depth interview with a seasoned entrepre-
neur, this exploratory study lends further support to the
widely held, but largely unsubstantiated, view that persist-
ence is vital to entrepreneurial survival. The study also
revealed a potentially useful distinction between “blind” per-
sistence (persistence on principle) and “calculated persist-
ence” (persistence grounded in sound business judgment).
The latter has two components: analytical (starting with a
thoroughly researched and vetted business plan), and intu-
itive (a sixth sense built up over years of in-the-trenches com-
mercial experience). Further research is needed to under-
stand the nature of calculated persistence, as well as its rela-
tionship with performance persistence—the notion that
entrepreneurs who have at least one successful venture-
backed company under their belt are more likely to succeed
in their next venture-backed firm.
PERSISTENCE AND SURVIVAL IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE CASE OF THE WAVE ENERGY CONVERSION CORPORATION OF AMERICA 25
25
et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Spring/Fall 2012
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2012
Endnotes
1. McCormick’s experience in wave-energy conversion dates back to 1973, when he was the U.S. Coast Guard Research
Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, studying oscillating water-column wave-energy conversion. Appointed the Corbin A.
McNeill Professor of Naval Engineering in 2007, he is the author of Ocean Energy Mechanics (Cambridge University Press,
2009).
2. It is useful to distinguish between energy density (how much energy the waves can carry), energy conversion efficiency
(how much usable energy can be harvested from the waves with a technology such as the MWP),and embodied energy (what
it costs to harvest, transform, and distribute this energy to its point of use).The latter two have yet to be demonstrated.
3. Since this interview took place, the venture split into two divisions: Ocean Energy Systems is now solely concerned with
potable water production;WECCA focuses exclusively on electricity production.
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T he theory presented suggests that underwriters areboth advisors and independent agents in theissuer’s attempt to send “signals” of quality to
investors by making pre-IPO organizational changes.These
pre-IPO gambits are intended to increase IPO proceeds, and
preemptively address potential investor concerns that
would deter them from subscribing. These organizational
changes initially can financially benefit founders, early
investors and underwriters. But they can also have a long-
term impact that some issuers, especially founders, would
prefer to avoid. Utilizing signaling and resource-based
power, we find that underwriter power is significantly asso-
ciated with making pre-IPO gambits and lower levels of
underpricing.
Keywords: initial public offerings, resource-based power, sig-
naling, organizational theory, underpricing
Over the past thirty years and especially in the last ten, there
has been an enormous amount of research on the signals of
quality that differentiate and add value to new issues in the
eyes of investors. One reason for this interest was the high
levels of new issue underpricing that occurred in the 1990s,
when average levels reached as high as 65% of offer price
(Loughran & Ritter, 2004). In the late 1990s, strategy and
entrepreneurship researchers turned their attention to initial
public offerings (IPOs) and focused on identifying quality sig-
nals that increase investor perceptions of value and help
reduce levels of underpricing (Beatty, 1989; Beatty & Ritter,
1986; Certo, 2003; Chemmanur & Paeglis, 2005; Grinblatt &
Hwang, 1989; Gulati & Higgins, 2003).This attention is more
than justified in the case of entrepreneurship. One cannot
forget that the entrepreneurial process is not limited to the
discovery of an innovation but the creation of value from the
innovation,which involves the ability to gather the resources
to create a viable business organization and navigate the envi-
ronment to exploit the innovation‘s value.Among the many
challenges is the ability to raise funds to support the growth
of the organization, and that need, in many cases, leads to an
IPO.Also for many entrepreneurs, the IPO is the first chance
to monetize some of the sweat equity that has been accruing
during the early stages of the firm.
Among the signal theory research streams, some have sug-
gested that investors assign value to the backgrounds, experi-
ences, and prestigious ties of an issuing firm’s top manage-
ment team (TMT), board of directors, and affiliates (Certo,
2003; Chen, Pollock, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2005; Filatotchev
& Bishop, 2002; Gulati & Higgins, 2003). Identifying accurate
signals of quality is particularly interesting to investors and
academics because of the high volume of subsequent and
dramatic failures that occurred in the late 1990s. Some of
these signals are the result of industry choice, long-term strat-
egy,and founding conditions that evolve slowly or are central
to a firm’s business model, while other signals can be manip-
ulated prior to a firm’s IPO in order “dress up”for a more suc-
cessful sale to the public. Some firms choose to add presti-
gious executives, directors, and affiliates just before going
public to add legitimacy and to address potential investor
concerns preemptively. This process is particularly stressful
for the entrepreneur, who has to relinquish part of the con-
trol and autonomy to the new management, but also stresses
the existing organizations.These changes can be bittersweet;
the cost of these new individuals is high, and top manage-
ment changes can cause long-term disruption and shift in cul-
ture if these changes include replacing the original founding
entrepreneurs or long-tenured employees. Therefore many
issuers would be reluctant to bring in new people.
Underwriters with their superior power, however, may chal-
lenge the issuer to make these changes regardless of cost or
firm disruption, since they bear neither expense and these
changes make the shares easier to sell (see Figure 1).
Past theories have looked at signals in a static state or a sin-
gle point in time, and ignore movement occurring during the
period leading up to the offer date. These theories identify
the issuers as the signaling actor, whereas this study moves
the underwriter into the forefront of pre-IPO signaling.
Previous research has tested for the moderating effect of
underwriter prestige, but has not looked at differences in rel-
ative power on a deal-by-deal basis.This study will empirical-
ly test the impact of relative bargaining power on issuers’pre-
IPO strategies. Finally, the theory and methods used in this
article will take a resources-based approach to measure each
actor’s bargaining strength compared to the other, and use
that difference to predict outcomes at the deal level.
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Background
The market for IPOs is characterized by product uncertainty,
asymmetric information, and adverse selection. In these mar-
kets, it is critical for sellers to signal a high-quality firm image;
otherwise,buyers cannot differentiate between their product
and lower quality vendors.Akerlof (1970) referred to this as
a “lemons problem” where in the absence of quality signals,
buyers are only willing to pay the lowest possible price.
Spence (1973) defined signals as “observable characteristics
[that convey information] attached to the individual [in this
case firm] that are subject to manipulation by him” (p. 357).
We apply these concepts and definitions in the context of
new issues; the signaler [firm] attempts to convey favorable
information to affect the [receiver’s] subjective assessment
about the quality of the firm’s equity. Spence (1973) separat-
ed attributes into two categories, indices and signals.
Investors seek information about the issuer, which man-
agers, along with their underwriter, provide in the form of a
prospectus and to some a “road show.” The preliminary
prospectus meets the criteria of a signal in that it is both
observable and known in advance of the investment decision
(Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2005; Ross, 1977), and contains a
plethora of indices and signals. Indices that are unalterable
attributes include industry (Bain, 1968; Porter, 1980), geo-
graphic location(Porter, 1990), firm age, and size (Kim &
Ritter, 1999; Singh, House, & Tucker, 1986). Each of these
attributes has been empirically found to add firm value or
enhance chances for survival. Financial data, prestigious
executives, and alliances can be manipulated over time by
the firm and as such we categorize them differently as “sig-
nals.”The resources used by the applicant to create this sig-
nal Spence terms “signaling costs.”
Signals of quality come in many different forms.Academics
who favored the knowledge-based view have focused on
intellectual properties, R&D spending, and scientific capabil-
ities (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Deeds, DeCarolis, & Coombs,
1998; Higgins & Gulati, 2006), while others have looked at
social ties and legitimacy (Higgins & Gulati, 2003).A firm that
is taken public by a prestigious underwriter assumes the
gloss of that underwriter’s industry reputation and corporate
brand image (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Benveniste & Spindt,
1989; Carter & Manaster, 1990; Cooney, Singh, Carter, & Dark,
2001). Simunic and Stein (1987), Beatty (1989), and Balvers
et. al. (1988) found that IPO market participants pay a premi-
um for auditor credibility.
The prestigious ties of top executives and board members
allow the firm access to a broader and richer set of resources
(Certo, 2003; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Chemmanur &
Paeglis, 2005; Jackson & Hambrick, 2002; Podolny, 1993) and
can also be a signal to investors. Further, firms become a
reflection of their top managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) suggested that TMTs that
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Figure 1. Model of Pre-IPO Organizational Change and effect on Underpricing
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exhibit high quality and noteworthy reputations can “convey
the intrinsic value of their firm more credibly to outsiders”
and provide a certification function (p.332).
Signaling Theory
An important feature of Spence’s 1973 signaling model is its
dynamic and iterative nature as signals of applicant quality
are sent to employers and wage schedules as a function of
the signals and indices are sent back potential applicants.The
same can be said for new issuing firms and the prospectus
signals. Investors send signals in the form of equity orders
and concerns during the book-building process and through
ultimate purchase. Further, investors can communicate addi-
tional valuation signals indirectly through the underwriters
during the roadshows. These signals can include intent to
buy, concerns of operating history, management experience,
industry position, and investment risk. Underwriters have
stored signals from these investors’ previous deals and pur-
chase experience. As a consequence, the underwriter
becomes a repository of both signals of quality and signals
of concern, which they translate into current investor’s pref-
erences and pricing schedules and is graphically shown in
Figure 2.
Thus, an important benefit of hiring an active underwriter
with a good track record is its ability to counsel issuing firms
on the best way to market themselves to investors.
Underwriters inform issuers of investors’ preferences during
the preparation and registration periods of the pre-IPO
process, completing the signaling cycle. Underwriters typi-
cally suggest changes the firm can implement to improve
both the array and quality of their signals to improve
investors’ likely reaction.
It is interesting to note that underwriters are depicted in
Figure 2 as an independent third party in the iterative
process and not simply as part of the issuer’s team.Treating
the underwriter as independent is an extension of Spence’s
dyad and a departure from the way strategy and finance
researchers have applied signaling theory to the IPO context.
Issuers and underwriters work together to subscribe the
offering fully but they also have divergent motives as well.
Extant theory has not characterized the underwriter as an
additional, independent actor in the signaling loop. However,
underwriters take title to the equity in “firm offer” IPOs—the
most common type (Ellis, Michaely, & O'Hara, 2001). They
then sell the equity to their own customers whom they have
an ongoing relationship. Therefore, underwriters have an
independent financial self-interest to maximize, as well as
their own reputation to protect and may not share congruent
objectives with the issuer. For example, underwriters may
not communicate all of the signals they receive from
investors during the book-building process, choosing instead
to keep a portion of that information private (Biais,Bossaerts,
& Rochet, 2002). Signals regarding the actual demand, and
the price investors are willing to pay, can be screened by
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underwriters wanting to set a lower offer to increase profit
for their investing clients and lower their risk (Houston,
James, & Karceski, 2006; Loughran & Ritter, 2004).
Long-Term Signals vs. Short-Term Gambits
While most industry and performance characteristics cannot
be changed close to the IPO, some IPO signals can be modi-
fied during the preparation stages. Examples include earn-
ings (Teoh,Welch, & Wong, 1998), use of proceeds (Busaba,
Benveniste, & Guo, 2001), and the auditor of record (Balvers
et al., 1988; Carpenter & Strawser, 1971). However, previous
research has not differentiated human capital signals based
on the length of time at the firm so executives who are
brought in a few months before the IPO are not considered
part of a short-term actively signaling strategy. For that rea-
son, short-term, pre-IPO firm changes with the intent to
increase the value of the firm,we term “gambits.”For both the
investor and the academic, it is important to differentiate
organically-derived long-term signals of firm quality from
short-term, pre-IPO gambits aimed at increasing IPO pro-
ceeds, since these strategies can have different short-term
and long-term consequences (see Table 1).
Strategies aimed at increased short-term proceeds may
have negative long-term financial or organizational impact.
Another reason to distinguish organizational changes close to
the time of the IPO is to determine who is actually doing the
signaling. Is it the issuer attempting to increase demand and
equity value? Or, is it the underwriter attempting to maxi-
mize its profit and reduce risk while having the issuer bear
the signaling costs?
Making changes to members of the TMT can create short-
term disruption and trigger longer-term turbulence. Hannan,
Polos,and Carroll (2003) term this effect “cascading organiza-
tional change.”This process begins with a change in an orga-
nization’s formal architecture and prompts other changes in
the organization,generating a cascade of changes that initiate
periods of reorganization. Burton, Helliar, and Power (2004)
questioned executives in the top management on change
prior to their flotation. Forty-six percent of respondents
observed that after the decision to go public was made, there
was a change in top management personnel prior to the
flotation. After the flotation, 44 percent of those who
changed observed additional changes in top management.
The organizational changes can effect culture, corporate mis-
sion, personnel policies, internal processes, and alter employ-
ee’s implicit contracts, bases of power and fit with the organ-
ization resulting in turnover (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell,
1991). In summary, pre-IPO organizational changes can have
positive or negative impact on the issuing firm.We argue that
the issuing firm’s managers would resist making these
changes and incurring these additional costs unless the firm
encountered strong underwriter influence, and it lacked the
requisite bargaining power to resist.
Relative Bargaining Power and Hypotheses
Instead of thinking of underwriters as commissioned sales
agents, they can be viewed as a larger retailer who profits on
every unit sold. The parties negotiate on the price paid for
the product and the resulting margin with each side wanting
to maximize its position. This framework is conceptually
grounded in bargaining power and dependence perspective
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In the IPO context, the issuer
offers its equity for sale. If it is a strong company, its resources
will be a well-known brand name. The underwriter has its
own resources such as co-managers, a strong book of institu-
tional and retail investors, and most importantly stock ana-
lysts who can help promote the stock in the aftermarket. A
firm that has the option to contribute or withhold an impor-
tant resource or input can use that option as bargaining lever-
age (Pfeffer,1981).For example, the underwriter could refuse
to continue the IPO if the firm chooses not to make organi-
zational changes or does not accept the offer price.
During the IPO process, issuers are required by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to furnish a
detailed description of the firm’s operations, and audited
financial statements (Beatty, 1989). The prestigious auditor
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Table 1. A Topology of IPO Signals
Issuer Attributes Description
Indices Age, size, industry, geography, etc. Observable and unalterable.
Signals of quality (issuers) Firm performance, IP portfolio, profits, debt-level,
product offerings, long-term employees and affili-
ates, etc.
Intrinsic and gained through organic growth or the
execution of long-term strategy.
Signals of concern (investors) Short operating history, insufficient revenue/profit,
inexperienced management, uncertain of
present/future technology pipeline.
Concerns voiced or inferred by investors during
book-building process, or from past deals that nega-
tively affect demand for equity offering
Gambits Choice of underwriter, auditor, CEO, CFO, COO,
chairman, directors, etc.
Alterable through execution of short-term IPO
strategy to project quality image and allay
investor’s concerns
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selection is important to address investors’ agency-related
concerns about the firm’s control system (Simunic & Stein,
1987), add legitimacy and transfer status (Stuart, Hoang, &
Hybles, 1999), address the ex ante uncertainty, and signal the
quality of private information about the firm’s future
prospects to investors who fear a “lemons problem.” Support
for this idea is provided in Carpenter and Strawser’s (1971)
review, which found that underwriters can influence an
issuer to switch from their smaller or regional auditor to a
large, nationally recognized firm.The foundation of bargain-
ing power is evident in hypothesis 1.
H1: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power are
more likely to change auditors. 
As the firm is a reflection of the top managers (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984), the CEO will attract the most scrutiny from
investors.Young entrepreneurial firms with a short operating
history, or an inexperienced management team, generate
fears about the CEO’s ability to successfully transition from a
private to a public firm (Flamholtz, 1986), and meet future
prospectus expectations. Public firms experience more gov-
ernmental requirements, shareholder scrutiny, and interfer-
ence from special interest groups, in addition to creating and
implementing their strategic plan.The CEO’s job has a high
level of complexity, ambiguity, and information overload
(Mintzberg, 1973). Even though inexperienced managers can
be helped by veteran directors, investors will be concerned
if the requisite skills do not reside in the top executive.
Therefore, in situations of young inexperienced founders and
or managers whose firm is now moving to a new level of
expectation, underwriters will try to replace the CEO with a
manager that has recognized legitimacy in the role and will
address investor concerns. However, convincing a CEO to
step aside is a difficult task especially if the CEO is
entrenched or has substantial ownership. In those cases,
underwriters can move to bolster the signals to investors by
bringing in an experienced manager to be the chief operat-
ing officer (COO).Potential investors will also signal concern
if the issuer’s chief financial officer (CFO) lacks public corpo-
ration experience.
During the registration process, issuers use their under-
writer to help prepare the necessary disclosures to the SEC.
However,after the public offering the responsibility for finan-
cial disclosure becomes the obligation of its corporate finan-
cial officers. On-going shareholder communication can be
difficult for financial officers with limited, pre-IPO experi-
ence yet managing stockholders expectations and resultant
stock prices is a central CFO responsibility (Zhang &
Margarethe, 2009; Zorn, 2004). New public enterprises
require stable, reliable earnings, which may require income
smoothing,expense accruals for the year ahead, and earnings
estimates for portfolio managers (Teoh et al., 1998). Private
companies usually have more leeway to have profits in peaks
and valleys, whereas public firms must have a more reliable
profitability consistent with management’s forecasts. Small,
private companies with home-grown accountants and book-
keepers lack this experience. The CFO also has a primary
responsibility to shareholders to disclose accurate financial
results. Shareholder and stock analysts will be assessing the
reliability of the internal financial disclosures of the issuer.
The higher the prestige of the financial officer’s background
the more confident investors will feel about the firm’s
prospective financial reporting. Different from the auditor
who certifies past performance and current inventories, the
CFO certifies future cash flows and cash needs.The struggle
between current management and the underwriter’s wishes
is evident in the next three hypotheses.
H2a: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power are
more likely to change CEOs.
H2b: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power
are more likely to add a COO.
H2c: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power are
more likely to change CFOs. 
H2d: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power
are more likely to change the chairman of the board.
Agency theorists have long been concerned about the con-
flict of interest between shareholders and management
(Fama & Jensen, 1983).This concern is more acute in young
firms that may not have a quality signaling reputation.
Neubaum, Mitchell, and Schminke (2004) found a positive
relationship between firm age and an ethical climate focused
on self-interest and company profit. They suggested that
young firms “faced with the liability of newness, scarcity of
resources, and concerns for survival might be pressured to
make choices that run counter to the tenets of more devel-
oped ethical and moral reasoning” (p. 336). IPO firms tend to
be young, with an average age of seven years (Ritter, 1991).
Directors can also have a positive effect on young TMTs and
bring a wealth of experience, social capital, and legitimacy to
firms short on operating history or management experience.
Issuers and underwriters can signal equity quality to
investors through the prestige of its board members, which
enhances the firm’s social networks and access to critical
resources (Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
They are also perceived as valuable mentors to young man-
agers (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Johnson, Ellstrand, &
Daily, 1996). Experienced investors will signal concerns
about potential deficiencies in a limited board of directors.
Investor’s concerns might be placated with the addition of
directors with operating experience, or prestigious social
networks and backgrounds in financial control.Underwriters
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will then press issuers to add directors with these qualities.
The intersection between these actors’ preferences and the
interplay of the relative bargaining power of the issuer and
underwriter are evident in the next hypothesis.
H3: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power are
more likely to add new directors.
For the issuer,one financial purpose of making these changes
prior to going public is to reduce the level of underpricing.
Many studies have shown a negative relationship between
TMT prestige and underpricing (Certo, 2003; Chen et al.,
2005; Cohen & Dean, 2005). Hiring new top managers with
an eminent IPO can be costly as these individuals will be
looking to be compensated in both salary and equity. Pre-IPO
equity will be available at a discount and worth more at this
point.So the benefits in additional proceeds should outweigh
the cost in salary and in benefits.Otherwise it would be more
sensible to wait until after the IPO and pay with shares that
are worth more and options with a higher strike price.
Therefore, it would follow that
H4a: Issuers that add new top executives in the six
months prior to their IPO will experience lower lev-
els of underpricing.
H4b: Issuers that add new directors in the six months
prior to their IPO will experience lower levels of
underpricing.
Sample and Methods
Data and Sample
The sample was limited to firms that had their initial public
offering between May 1991 and June 1998 and were drawn
from the SDC New Issues Database. All the firms from eight
individual SIC codes were included, producing a total of 338
firms. The industries of Computer and Telecommunication
Hardware, Men’s and Women’s Apparel, Pharmaceuticals, and
Computer Software and Services provide the population of
firms used for this study.These industries represent both high-
growth and mature industries, manufacturing and service, as
well as high-technology and research-intensive firms. Unit
offerings, and issues with offering prices below $5 were
dropped,consistent with Loughram and Ritter (2004).To avoid
confusion between original hires and new hires, I dropped
firms less than two years old. Data for this sample was drawn
from SDC and COMPUSTAT. Data on management, tenure, and
equity ownership were obtained from S-1’s and final prospec-
tuses filed with the SEC. Information on firm founding dates,
for issuers that went public after 1996,was updated using data
provided by Alexander Ljungqvist, New York University. Data
collection techniques are detailed in Ljungqvist and Wilhelm
(2003). Additionally, underwriter data were drawn from the
Securities Industry Yearbook. IPOs with missing data from
either the issuer or underwriter were dropped to yield the
final sample of 224 issuing firms. The 66 lead underwriters
associated with these IPOs had a combined market share of
92.6% of the total IPO industry in the United States.
Measures
Dependent Variables. There are 7 different dependent vari-
ables for the hypotheses being tested. Five dummy variables
represent a single change in NewAuditor, NewCEO6,
NewCOO6, NewCFO6, and New Chair6, in the six months
preceding the public offering. One additional dummy, Top
Change6, represents a single change in any of the four TMT
positions.An executive is considered new if his or her tenure
in that position is less than six months.There are two contin-
uous dependent variables, one for NewDirector, which is the
number of new directors with less than six months tenure,
and underpricing, which can be obtained by combining the
offer price taken the final prospectus filed with the SEC, and
the first day closing price from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) utilizing the calculations: UP = P1 -
P0)/P0 (Certo et al., 2001; Pollock & Rindova, 2003).
Independent Variable. The measure for underwriter
power was a factor score created using factor analysis, a sta-
tistical technique abundant in social science literature and
employed to generate indexes used in regression analysis
(Chatterjee, Jamieson, & Wiseman, 1999). The items in this
factor are (1) number of institutional sales representatives,
(2) number of offices, (3) total number of Institutional
Investor (II) all-star analysts, (4) number of II all-star analysts
covering the industries of the issuer, (5) total assets of the
underwriters parent, (6) total departments of parent, and (7)
total employees of parent.The final factor had an eigenvalue
of 4.84, explained 69.1% of the variance, and had a Cronbach
alpha of 0.883.
The measure for Issuer power is also a factor score creat-
ed using factor analysis.The items in this factor are: (1) assets,
(2) liabilities, (3) expected market capitalization,and (4) offer
size. The factor analysis produced an eigenvalue 3.61,
explained 31.2% of the variance, and had a Cronbach alpha
of 0.807.
The measure of relative power is the ratio between issuer
power and underwriter power. Since the measures of power
are factor scores, they vary from a negative score to a positive
score with a mean of zero. In order to properly reflect rela-
tive power, it was necessary to make both component scores
positive by adding a constant, such that the minimum score
is 1.0. In determining the impact of such a relative score in
regression analysis, it is necessary to enter the two compo-
nent scores in an initial model, and then add the relative
score to determine whether relative power of the two parties
explains further variance.
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Control Variables. Several issuer and underwriter meas-
ures used in prior studies were included as controls to
enhance the confidence that significant findings here would
be adding to the base of knowledge in this area. Daily et al.
(2003) performed a meta-analysis on variables previously
associated with IPO underpricing in at least three prior stud-
ies (effect size 241, n=161,013). Their work was used as a
starting point in identifying control variables. Their meta-
analysis included: (1) retained equity (percent of officers and
director shares), (2) underwriter prestige (using Carter and
Manaster measure updated by Loughram and Ritter (2004),
(3) auditor reputation (1 if a Big 5 firm,else 0), (4) number of
risk factors, (5) firm size, (6) firm age, (7) number of uses, (8)
venture capital equity (1 or 0), (9) offer price, and (10) IPO
gross proceeds. The variable number of uses was dropped
here because it was not significant in their meta-analysis.
Most of the rationale for the variables included here has been
discussed earlier, however, for more information see Daily,
Certo, Dalton, and Roengpitya (2003). In addition, I include
dummy variables representing the four industry groups, and
a year variable to capture time-fixed effects.
Results
Descriptive statistics and inter-item correlations for the vari-
ables in the study can be found in Table 2.The results of this
study show that 224 issuers chose to make 465 new top man-
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Table 2. Logistic Regressions 
New Auditor New CEO New COO New CFO New Chairman
Variable Control Model 1 Control Model 2a Control Model 2b Control Model 2c Control Model 2d
Constant -2.614**  -1.854     -0.802     0.151     3.986     -3.895     -1.693     -2.609     -10.158** -10.084**
(1.201) (2.742) (1.769) (4.308) (2.415) (6.643) (1.156) (2.333) (1.27) (2.803)
Tele/Comp -0.243     -0.259     -1.684* -1.685* -0.992     -0.545     -0.065     0.039     0.697     0.699     
(0.491) (0.498) (1.14) (1.132) (1.081) (1.117) (0.393) (0.406) (0.597) (0.591)
Apparel 1.27**  1.283**  2.169     2.608     -3.047** -2.925* -0.589     -0.378     1.257* 1.273*
(0.607) (0.633) (0.894) (1.022) (1.228) (1.515) (0.616) (0.647) (0.734) (0.745)
Pharmaceuticals -1.393**  -1.361**  -1.139     -1.158     -2.321** -2.260* -0.519     -0.545     -0.327     -0.403     
(0.639) (0.647) (0.707) (0.72) (1.095) (1.334) (0.412) (0.43) (0.649) (0.661)
Age of Firm -0.02     -0.023     -0.4** -0.4** -0.596** -0.594** -0.01     -0.002     -0.224* -0.226*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.056) (0.06) (0.024) (0.028) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Year -0.037     -0.055     -0.432     -0.453     -0.547     -0.807     0.019     0.046     -0.216     -0.235     
(0.122) (0.124) (0.167) (0.18) (0.275) (0.352) (0.098) (0.103) (0.133) (0.138)
Pct. Insider Equity 0.011     0.012     -0.016     -0.017     -0.011     -0.012     0.001     0.000 1.380** 1.365**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Risk Factors 0.01     0.012     -0.02* -0.02* 0.045     0.085     -0.005     -0.001     -0.24*** -0.24***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.052) (0.055) (0.089) (0.096) (0.031) (0.033) (0.039) (0.04)
Venture Backed -0.09     -0.074     0.008     0.198     -0.434     -0.67     0.125     0.212     0.072** 0.072**
(0.414) (0.419) (0.575) (0.607) (0.722) (0.773) (0.331) (0.344) (0.469) (0.478)
Auditor Prestige 0.667     0.705     2.057     2.353     -0.546     -0.291     1.127     1.298     -0.339     -0.278     
(0.758) (0.774) (1.293) (1.362) (1.186) (1.239) (0.803) (0.828) (0.722) (0.744)
Offer Price 0.018     -0.002     -0.08     0.019     -0.153     0.059     -0.001     0.091     0.103     0.138     
(0.045) (0.063) (0.073) (0.09) (0.095) (0.152) (0.036) (0.052) (0.047) (0.07)
Underwriter Power -0.28 -0.788     0.499     -0.085     -0.531     
(0.615) (0.906) (1.700) (0.465) (0.61)
Issuer Power 0.394     0.259     -2.408     -0.518     0.325     
(0.731) (1.233) (2.204) (0.606) (0.74)
Issuer Power Ratio -0.446     -2.881     5.463     -0.773     -1.737     
(2.203) (3.559) (6.212) (1.785) (2.202)
-2 Log likelihood 184.446 183.429 113.107 108.111 58.941 52.853 269.51 258.969 160.409 158.89
PseudoRsq 0.313 0.025 0.014 0.001 0.218
* p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .01
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agement, and board hires in the six months leading up to
their IPO.The average number of days in registration for the
sample was 98 days and many firms work with their under-
writers preparing documents before the registration period
begins.There were 36 firms that switched auditors prior to
the IPO.The average age of the issuers since founding was 12
years, with the median at 7 years. This suggests that firms
were not strictly backfilling normal attrition. Most common
were new board members and CFOs.This could be to give
investors the perception that there is sufficient supervision
of management (Certo et al.,2001) and adequate oversight to
the preparation of the financial disclosures to reduce infor-
mation asymmetry (Cohen & Dean, 2005). One in 10 issuers
hired a new CEO, and 1 in 3.5 brought in a CFO. Of all the
new hires, the CEO position in particular meant that some-
one else was replaced. Of the 224 companies in the sample,
74 made new hires.The remaining 150 companies made an
average of more than 3 top management new hires prior to
going public.
Logistic regression analysis was used to test Hypotheses 1
to 2d. Each of the dependent variables was created and
coded 1 if there was a change in that position in the six
months prior to the offer date,otherwise 0.Since relative bar-
gaining power is theorized to help issuers resist influence to
make organizational changes, the hypothesized coefficient
should be negative. Multicolinearity did not pose a problem,
as the variance inflation factors for the full regression model
with 224 observations ranged from 1.06 to 1.86 (Chatterjee,
Hadi, & Price, 2000).The results for change in auditor, CEO,
and chairman show no significant association with relative
bargaining power, and in fact, underwriter prestige does not
significantly add to the explanation of variance (see Table 3).
Therefore, there is no support for Hypotheses 1, 2a, 2c, or 2d.
In all but one, new COO, the coefficient for relative resource
power is negative in the theoretical direction, however they
were not significant.As a group, the addition of explanatory
variables reduced the -2 Log likelihood a significant amount;
however, no single variable was significant on its own.
Because the Issuer Power Ratio is a linear combination of the
other two power measures, the VIF scores rose above 14 for
those variables in the last step, suggesting high multicollinear-
ity. Ultimately, Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported.
Hierarchical multiple regressions were used to test
Hypotheses 3 and 4.Consistent with the results found for the
TMT positions, the coefficients for issuer and underwriter
power are not significant or in the theoretical direction.
Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Hypothesis 4 was tested two
ways: with the independent variable as dummy representing
change in any of the 4 top management positions, and as a
continuous variable representing the sum of changes in the
top positions.The coefficient for bank prestige is positive and
significant, which is consistent with previous studies of the
underpricing in the 1990s.The coefficient for issuer power is
negative and significant, consistent with results from the first
two chapters.The issuer power ratio continues to be not sig-
nificant.When top management change is added, both coeffi-
cients are negative and significant, suggesting that the addi-
tion of one or more new top management executives will
reduce underpricing in a cumulative fashion. Therefore
Hypotheses 4a and 4b find strong support.The coefficient for
NewDirector <6 is negative in the theoretical direction but
not significant. Hypothesis 4c then is not supported.
Discussion 
Past studies of signaling theory have examined signals in a
static state.This research focuses on a subset of signals that
are part of an active selling strategy.Further,new measures of
power were incorporated to test whether the active signal-
ing is a strategy of the issuer or the underwriter. There are
two aspects of the signaling activity tested here: (1), whether
the signals are achieving the desired results, namely higher
IPO proceeds; and (2) whether the signals are coming from
the issuer or the underwriter. On the first point, it is clear
from the results that short-term gambits to improve the qual-
ity of the TMT have a significant positive effect on IPO pro-
ceeds.The average issue size in this study is $46.3 million and
the average level of underpricing is 18.8%. According to
Model 4a and 4b, the reduction in underpricing can vary
from $304,654 to $548,377 with the addition of one top
management executive. In a study of firms that made changes
in the final year prior to the IPO,Chen,Hambrick,and Pollock
(2008) found that firms spent between $120,000 to $385,000
per executive, depending on the proximity to offer date and
prestige of the individual. Combining the findings of the two
studies, firms will be more than compensated for the cost of
new hires through the reduction of underpricing.
While it is clear that issuers would enjoy these reduced
levels of underpricing, we know from other studies that
there is also a partial adjustment phenomenon, whereby the
underwriter only incorporates a small portion of the change
in value of a firm in the final few months before the offer date
(Bradley & Jordan, 2002; Hanley, 1993; Loughran & Ritter,
2004). While we can count in dollars the financial benefits
and costs to the issuer, we can only guess the impact and
entrepreneurial intensity on the entrepreneurial founding
members.Among the 237 sample firms, 131 still had at least
one founder in the company. However, some of these
founders were now chairman, functional department heads,
or CEOs. It was beyond the scope of this research project to
track the number of founders who were “kicked upstairs” to
make room for a new CEO,or “kicked sideways”to a function-
al job, such as head of technology, or “kicked out” entirely as
issuers and underwriters made pre-IPO organizational
changes.
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Table 3. Regressions: Dependent Variable New Directors and Underpricing
New Directors < 6 Underpricing Underpricing Underpricing
Parameter Control Model 1 Control Model 4a Control Model 4b Control Model 4c
(Constant) 1.643**  3.371**  -0.385*   -0.363*   -0.385*   -0.342     -0.385*   -0.354     
(0.714) (1.491) (0.215) (0.214) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) (0.218)
Comp/Telecom 0.075     0.069     0.039     0.043     0.039     0.037     0.039     0.04     
(0.294) (0.296) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Apparel 0.22     0.204     -0.018     -0.019     -0.018     -0.008     -0.018     -0.017     
(0.399) (0.407) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Pharma -0.257     -0.243     -0.101**  -0.105**  -0.101**  -0.11**  -0.101**  -0.103**  
(0.292) (0.297) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Age -0.007     -0.01     0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001     0.000 -0.001     
(0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year 0.018     -0.002     0.000 0.000 0.002     0.000 0.002     0.002     
(0.068) (0.068) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Insider Equity -0.006     -0.006     0.001     0.001     0.001     0.001     0.001     0.001     
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Risk Factors 0.011     0.015     0.006**  0.007**  0.006**  0.007**  0.006**  0.007**  
(0.021) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
VC Backed -0.394*   -0.378     0.04     0.041     0.04     0.04     0.04     0.037     
(0.234) (0.235) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Auditor Prestige -0.512     -0.494     -0.1*   -0.094     -0.1*   -0.093     -0.1*   -0.104*   
(0.411) (0.418) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.061)
Offer Price 0.052**  0.028     0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
(0.026) (0.035) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
IssuerPower 0.646     0.103**  0.101**  0.103**  0.095**  0.103**  0.099**  
(0.393) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
UnderwriterPower -0.48     -0.13**  -0.134**  -0.13**  -0.128**  -0.13**  -0.124**  
(0.316) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057)
IssuerPowerRatio -1.354     0.202     0.19     0.202     0.172     0.202     0.19     
(1.18) (0.17) (0.169) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.171)
Top Change6 -0.062**  
(0.031)
Total TMT Change -0.035*   
(0.019)
NewDirector6 -0.009     
(0.01)
R2 0.179 0.181 0.264 0.293 0.265 0.290 0.264 0.265
Adj. R2 0.133 0.130 0.218 0.246 0.219 0.242 0.218 0.216
_ R2 0.179 0.001 0.264 0.029 0.265 0.025 0.264 0.001
F Statistic 3.843 0.334 5.789 8.630 5.792 7.341 5.789 0.407
Significance 0.000 0.564 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.524
* p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05;*** p ≤ .01; Unstandardized Coefficients shown.
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While the issuers have extracted a benefit from adding
new hires, so has the underwriter.Thus, the second question
still remains: Who is doing the signaling? Unfortunately, the
remainder of the results here are inconclusive vis-à-vis an
association between organizational change and relative
resource power. In some of the regression analyses, relative
power approached significance. So part of the reason these
theories were not empirically supported was for the short-
comings in the research tools and variables identified in the
present study. I believe there is still work to be done in hon-
ing the methods and identifying modifiers. Yet there is also
the possibility that issuers are not being pressured into mak-
ing changes, but are doing so for other reasons.The lack of
significance in the predictors associated with change in audi-
tors could also suggest that issuers in these industries began
operations with national firms. The Big 5 accounting firms
are prevalent in IPO companies, and it may be that the effort
on their part to provide service to smaller technology firms
precluded the need for small firms to upgrade auditors. In
fact, during the period from 1998 to 2001 in these same
industries, only seven firms chose to go public with a firm
that was not one of the Big 5.
The lack of significance in the bargaining predictors for
CEOs and chairmen also suggests alternative explanations. It
was originally theorized that investors would be less confi-
dent of managers with limited operating experience. In prac-
tice, the age or experience of CEOs may not have been as big
a concern to investors as originally thought.One rationale for
the addition of a new chairman or COO would be to bolster
the experience level of young CEOs. However the average
age of new chairmen was 49.3, versus the average age of the
CEO in those companies,which was 47.7. Such a small differ-
ence in age would not warrant making such a change. Similar
findings were noted for the COO, where the average age of
the new hire was 42.5, while the CEO’s average age was 49.5
in those companies. Operating history also did not seem a
concern, as the cumulative amount of the new hires reached
the midpoint with firms that were of the median age of 7
years. Financial reporting may have been more important as
50% of the total number of CFOs hired occurred with firms
5 years or younger.Although some CFOs could be replacing
competent incumbents, it is also possible that some of these
young firms were hiring their first finance manager capable
of performing the accounting function for a public corpora-
tion. In that case the issuer was not dressing up, but arming
itself with the right tools to be successful.
The results surrounding the addition of new directors are
also puzzling. In Certo’s previous study,overall board size was
found to be significantly associated with reduced levels of
underpricing. However, the addition of new directors in this
study had no effect on underpricing. Although many new
directors were hired, young firms may not have been chang-
ing directors as much as staffing the positions in the first
place. To this point, a future retesting of this phenomenon
might include a measure on prestige. Furthermore, many
board positions run for three-year terms, so a larger amount
of turnover might occur in these positions as compared to
the CEO, COO, and CFO. Finally, the sample itself and the
make-up of firms included many with venture capital back-
ing. In such cases,members of the VCs might hold board posi-
tions that they may prefer to vacate after a liquidating event;
new hires in this scenario would not be hired as a result of
influence, but of need.
An analysis of the control variables is also of interest. First,
in the models for new CEOs and COOs,year is significant and
negative, suggesting that as the decade progressed fewer
companies were bringing in these types of executive at the
eleventh hour.This could be a reflection of the learning that
occurred earlier in the decade, that replacing technology
intensive company’s leaders may have had some of the nega-
tive effects described earlier. Another possible explanation
could be a lack of candidates as the sheer number of new
public companies would have taxed the available pool of
appropriate candidates. In the case of a new chairman, the
percent equity held variable reflects the current manage-
ment team’s ability to inhibit the addition of a “new boss,” so
that combined with the increase in risk factors may require
the addition of someone to address investors’ concerns.
Issuer size was also positive and significant in regressions for
new chairmen, implying that larger firms may require a sepa-
ration of board leadership from the executive team to
address investor’s concerns about potential agency conflicts.
Finally, underwriter prestige was negative and significant in
many of the regressions on new hires.This could be an indi-
cation that more prestigious underwriters tend toward
issuers who already have completed their final TMT imple-
mentation.There are ongoing relationships between VCs and
prestigious underwriters. One of the responsibilities of ven-
ture firms is to evaluate the TMTs of the firms in which they
invest, and make appropriate changes as a normal course of
business. That said, venture capital backing was not signifi-
cant in any of the regressions.
Limitations and Future Research
This study has several limitations that should be acknowl-
edged. First, although the industries chosen for the sample
are reflective of the companies that went public in abun-
dance during the 1990s, there is significant weighting toward
technology that limits the generalizability of the findings.
Technology firms in particular have higher levels of uncer-
tainty in valuation,and as such the addition of known individ-
uals may have a more pronounced effect on underpricing
than in other more easily valued industries. Second, an
assumption has been made that organizational changes made
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within six months of the IPO date are after the issuer and
underwriter agree to work together.This may not always be
the case. Actual contract dates are not available to the
researcher so the assumption is reasonable in most but not
all cases.Third, I made the assumption that new hires made
just before the IPO would be made with an eye to upgrade
the organization from the perception of investors. I did not,
however, track prestigious affiliations that could provide an
interesting filter. Fourth, although my argument for under-
writer influence hinges on relative power derived from
resources, I did not pursue key informant observations from
individuals involved with each IPO
Future research should attempt to refine the measures of
relative bargaining power in this setting. Key informant stud-
ies would be helpful to uncover any latent variable not
included here. It would also be of keen interest to track
exactly how many original founders were displaced and
what effect it had on those individuals as well as the entre-
preneurial spirit of the firm. In addition, it would be of great
interest to track the tenure and performance of these late
hires to see if they have a positive or negative long-term
effect on the issuing firm.
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Self-employment is presented as enabling people tobetter balance their work and family roles butresearch on its effectiveness is equivocal.We collected
survey data from 280 self- and organizationally-employed
certified public accountants and conducted a multivariate
analysis comparing positive spillover and conflict between
the two groups.The self-employed reported less work-to-fam-
ily conflict with no differences with respect to family-to-
work conflict or positive spillovers.However, there were dif-
ferent patterns between male and female subsamples: self-
employed males experienced less conflict and more positive
spillover than male employees, whereas self-employed
females had less of one form of conflict but more of the
other.
Keywords: positive spillover; work–family conflict; self-
employment; gender; accountants 
Self-employment embodies the American dream for many,
and the growth in self-employment over the last three
decades suggests that more and more Americans are making
that dream come true.Although estimates vary, approximate-
ly 19% of workers in the United States were self-employed in
2002, compared to 11.5% in 1973 (Bond, Thompson,
Galinsky, & Prottas, 2003; Quinn & Staines, 1979). More men
than women are self-employed, but self-employment is
increasing more rapidly for women than men (DeMartino &
Barbato, 2003; Hughes, 2003).
Self-employment has long been considered a strategy for
gaining control over inter-role conflict as individuals seek to
work for pay outside of the household while continuing to
function as a member within the household (Heilman &
Chen, 2003; Kanter, 1977; Moore, 1999; Parker, 1967), an
assumption that may help explain the increasing numbers of
women business owners. Researchers have found that
women who choose self-employment report that family con-
cerns are a primary motivator (Buttner & Moore, 1997;
Barbato, DeMartino & Jacques, 2009; DeMartino & Barbato,
2003), and the presence of children at home has been found
to be predictive of self-employment among women (Caputo
& Dolinsky, 1998; Carr, 1996). In a study of female and male
entrepreneurs with MBAs, DeMartino and Barbato (2003)
found gender differences in reported motivation for self-
employment.Women were more likely to say that they chose
self-employment because of family obligations and to gain
career flexibility; men were more likely to report wealth cre-
ation as a motivator.
Surprisingly, there is limited empirical evidence support-
ing self-employment as an especially effective tactic for bal-
ancing work and family demands. Loscocco (1997), for exam-
ple, found that among the self-employed women she inter-
viewed, the needs of the business and the needs of children
often conflicted. Neider (1987) reported that 69 percent of
the women business owners in her study were divorced, and
many blamed the breakup of their marriage on the emphasis
they placed on their businesses. Female small business own-
ers in Hisrich and Brush’s (1984) study reported that the
demands of the business impinged on their personal lives,
and Stoner, Hartman, and Arora (1990) found substantial
work-to-family conflict among self-employed women.
More recent research compares the experiences of the
self-employed to the organizationally employed. For exam-
ple,Tetrick,Slack,Da Silva,and Sinclair (2000) found that con-
flict between one’s job and personal life did not differ among
owners,managers, and employees.Parasuraman and Simmers
(2001) found that the self-employed reported more general
work-to-family (W!F) conflict than employees while
Reynolds and Renzulli (2005) found that the self-employed
had less “work interferes with life” conflict but more “life
interferes with work” conflict. Prottas (2007) found that
translators who worked as independent contractors reported
less W!F conflict but more family-to-work (F!W) than
either owners or employees of translation companies.
Analyzing a large (n = 3,504) national sample, Prottas and
Thompson (2006) found that independent contractors
reported less W!F conflict than either owners or employees
but found no differences with respect to F!W conflict.
That self-employment appears not to be a clearly benefi-
cial strategy for managing work and family may be due to self-
employment being more stressful with greater job pressures
related to the high failure rate of small businesses, longer
work hours, or lack of vacation time (Prottas & Thompson,
2006; Thompson, Kopelman, & Schriescheim, 1992). How-
ever, it is also possible that researchers have been focusing on
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either an incomplete array of possible outcomes or the
wrong criterion. As with research on the organizationally-
employed, research on the self-employed has been rooted in
scarcity theories that emphasize the conflictive nature of
work and family interactions rather than possible positive
spillovers between the domains (Greenhaus & Powell, 2006;
Kossek & Ozeki, 1998). However, it may be that the benefits
of self-employment are less likely to be found in the reduc-
tion of the negative or conflictive interactions between the
two domains than in the enhancement of positive or facilita-
tive interactions.An emerging stream of theory and research
has examined positive outcomes of the work–family inter-
face among employees in the forms of enrichment, positive
spillover, enhancement, and facilitation (e.g., Greenhaus &
Powell, 2006). This emphasis may have particular relevance
for understanding the work and family relationships of self-
employed people. This research contributes to the prior
research by measuring and comparing positive spillovers as
well as conflict.
There is theoretical and empirical support for the view
that the interface between work and family of the self-
employed might qualitatively differ from that of employees.
Building on Parker’s (1967) work, Kanter (1977) argued that
some occupations are highly absorptive (i.e., they demand
high levels of commitment from the worker and define the
context for family life), and as a result,“work and family may
be so closely intertwined as to make it virtually impossible to
consider one without considering the other” (p.26).
Absorptive occupations may diminish or minimize bound-
aries between work and family, thus creating highly integrat-
ed, permeable boundaries rather than segmented domains
(Ashforth, Kreiner, & Fugate, 2000). Because of the nature of
owning one’s own business (e.g., the owner’s financial well-
being is often dependent on the success of the business), it
seems likely that much self-employment is highly absorptive.
Consequently, family and work domains may be more inte-
grated for the self-employed than for the organizationally
employed. In fact,Thompson et al. (1992) found that job and
life satisfaction were more strongly related for the self-
employed than for employees, thus providing initial empiri-
cal support for Kanter’s views about the absorptive nature of
self-employment.
To further understand the ways in which work and family
are connected for the self-employed, the work–family litera-
ture is instructive. First, research suggests that the interac-
tions between work and family are bi-directional in nature
with antecedents and consequences that differ depending on
whether the influence is from work-to-family or from family-
to-work. Second, both the negative and positive interactions
between work and family appear to be multidimensional in
nature. Conflict has been described in terms of three dimen-
sions: time-, strain-, and behavior-based conflict (Greenhaus &
Beutell, 1985). Positive spillover or enrichment occurs when
positive experiences in one role are transferred to another
role (Greenhaus & Powell, 2006) and appears to have multi-
ple dimensions. Hanson, Hammer, and Colton (2006) argued
that positive spillover has two dimensions: an affective
dimension (i.e., affect or emotion spills over from one role to
another) and an instrumental dimension (i.e., skills, abilities,
and values developed in one role are applied in another
role). Carlson, Kacmar,Wayne and Grzywacz (2006) suggest-
ed additional dimensions (e.g., capital, which occurs when
involvement in work enhances personal resources such as
confidence, or self esteem). Third, conflict and positive
spillover are orthogonal constructs and are not simply oppo-
site ends of the same continuum (Frone, 2003; Greenhaus &
Powell, 2006). While there are many terms for related con-
structs regarding the interactions between domain roles, we
use the terms conflict to refer to negative interactions and
positive spillover to refer to beneficial ones, distinguish
between work and family domains, and use W!F and F!W
to indicate directionality.
Hypotheses
The Conservation of Resources Theory (COR; Hobfoll, 1989;
2001) is useful for making predictions about the degree to
which positive spillover and work–family conflict are related
to work arrangement. Hobfoll argued that people strive to
obtain, build, and protect resources (e.g., objects such as
their home or conditions such as financial security) and they
experience stress when resources are lost or threatened with
loss. He further argued that resource loss is more salient than
resource gain, and that individuals with greater resources are
more capable of resource gain.
In COR terms, the self-employed have a major resource
advantage over the organizationally employed as they tend to
have greater job autonomy (Hundley, 2001; Parasuraman &
Simmers, 2001; Prottas, 2007; Prottas & Thompson, 2006;
Tetrick et al., 2000).Although self-employment is often char-
acterized by longer hours, greater risk, and more job pres-
sures (Thompson et al., 1992), greater autonomy might offset
those conditions. According to Karasek’s (1979) demands-
control theory, having control over one’s job diminishes the
impact of demands on stress and health. Research has
demonstrated that individuals’ perceptions of personal con-
trol (i.e., beliefs about their ability to change their environ-
ment) were associated with enhanced health and well-being
(Ganster, Fox, & Dwyer, 2001). Similarly, Grzywacz and Marks
(2000) found that decision latitude, an aspect of job autono-
my, was related to positive spillover between work and fami-
ly, and Voydanoff (2004) found that job autonomy was posi-
tively related to work to family facilitation.Further, job auton-
omy has been found to be negatively related to W!F conflict
(Parasuraman & Simmers, 2001; Prottas, 2007; Prottas &
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Thompson, 2006). Interestingly, Parasuraman, Purohit,
Godshalk, and Beutell (1996) found that job autonomy was
negatively related to F!W conflict but not W!F, whereas
Reynolds and Renzulli (2005) found it was negatively related
to W!F conflict but not F!W.
Following both COR and the demands-control theory, we
expected that job autonomy would serve as an important,
dominant resource for the self-employed such that they would
experience higher levels of positive W!F spillover and lower
levels of both W!F and F!W conflict. Further, we expected
that after controlling for the effects of autonomy, any differ-
ences in positive spillover and conflicts would diminish.
H1a. The self-employed will report less W!F and
F!W conflict than employees.
H1b. The differences between the self-employed and
employees with respect to W!F and F!W conflict
will be attenuated after controlling for job autonomy.
H2a. The self-employed will report more positive
W!F spillover than employees.
H2b. The differences between the self-employed and
employees with respect to positive W!F spillover
will be attenuated after controlling for job autonomy.
Gender and Self-employment
Self-employed women and men appear to have varying moti-
vations for seeking self-employment. As discussed earlier,
women’s decisions to seek self-employment are more likely
to be affected by family structure, including factors such as
marital status, spousal income, and presence of children
(Carr, 1996; DeMartino & Barbato, 2003).Women, regardless
of employment status, continue to spend more time on child
and general homecare responsibilities than men, and are
more likely to work part time and at home (Bond et al., 2003;
Parasuraman & Simmers, 2001; Reynolds & Renzulli, 2005).
Gender role theory suggests that normative, gender-based
expectations influence women’s and men’s decisions about
how much time to allocate to parenting and home roles,with
women often taking on the primary responsibility for the
family/home sphere (Gutek, Searle, & Klepa, 1991; Parasura-
man & Simmers, 2001; Reynolds & Renzulli, 2005). However,
while working women may in general have different role
demands than working men in general, there is no clear the-
oretical reason to believe that self-employment will represent
a more or less effective method of managing work and fami-
ly roles for women than it is for men. We will compare the
levels of conflict and positive spillover by subsamples of men
and women on a post hoc basis.
Method
Sample
Data were collected from 280 Certified Public Accountants
(CPAs) working in Mid-Atlantic states.The sample frame con-
sisted of CPAs whose names, business addresses, and email
addresses were available from publicly accessible directories
of state professional associations.The initial sampling frame
was assembled to produce a final sample that was over-rep-
resented by self-employed. Email pre-advices were sent, fol-
lowed by a mailing of surveys with stamped self-addressed
return envelopes. Three to four weeks after the mailings,
email follow-ups were sent (which included a link where
they could download an electronic version of the survey).
The response rate was 31 percent of delivered mailings.
Demographic variables assessed included gender, age,
individual income, and marital status (married or living with
a partner).
Work Arrangement was determined by asking partici-
pants to classify themselves in terms of the following seven
categories: sole practitioner (with no full-time employees
other than yourself); sole practitioner (with one or more non-
CPA employees); partner (with at least one-third partnership
interest) in a public accountancy firm;partner (with less than
one-third partnership interest) in a public accountancy firm;
employee of a public accountancy firm (nonpartner);
employee of other than a public accountancy firm; other.
Those who chose “other” provided sufficient information to
be classified as owners of firms. As some large public
accountancy firms have thousands of “partners,” for purposes
of this study we felt it necessary to distinguish between part-
ners whose ownership interests were sufficiently large to
provide them with rights and responsibilities that are more
generally associated with ownership. Partners with less than
one-third partnership interests and employees of public
accountancy and other organizations were classified as
employees while partners with at least one-third partnership
interest and sole practitioners were classified as self-
employed.
Job Autonomy was assessed by four items from Beehr
(1976) (e.g., “I have enough freedom as to how I do my
work”). Participants were asked to indicate whether they
agreed that each statement described their job with a 7-point
Likert scale (e.g., strongly disagree, neither disagree/agree,
strongly agree). Items were scored so that higher values indi-
cated greater autonomy and averaged. The Cronbach alpha
coefficient of internal reliability was .94.
Work Flexibility was assessed by four items from Clark
(2002) (e.g.,“I could easily take a day off from work, if I want-
ed to”). One item,“I can carry out non-work projects during
spare time at work,” was changed slightly to omit the refer-
ence to an employer to make it appropriate for self-
employed. The same response options were provided. The
alpha was .85. As the autonomy and flexibility items were
associated with constructs that seemed conceptually related,
we conducted an exploratory factor analysis (principle com-
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ponent with Varimax rotation) on the eight items.The result
was a single factor solution (Eigenvalue of 5.4, accounting for
67.9% of variance). For this study we used an eight-item scale
of autonomy/flexibility with an alpha of .92.
Conflict and Positive Spillovers were assessed by 16
items. F!W conflict was assessed by four items from Gutek
et al., (1991) (e.g.,” I’m often too tired at work because of the
things I have to do at home”and “People that I work with dis-
like how often I am preoccupied with my personal life”).
W!F conflict was assessed by four items adapted from
Kopelman, Greenhaus, and Connolly (1983) (e.g., “My work
takes up time I would rather spend with my family”). In one
item,“supervisors and peers” was changed to “people that I
work with” to better suit self-employed participants. Positive
F!W spillover was assessed by four items.Two were  from
the 2002 National Study of the Changing Workforce (Bond et
al., 2003) (“I am often in a better mood at my job because of
my family or personal life” and “I often have more energy to
do my job because of my family or personal life”) and two
were developed for this study (“Talking with my friends or
family often helps me deal with problems at work” and” My
friends or family often do things that help me get my work
done or do my job better”). Positive W!F spillover was
assessed by four parallel items. All items had 7-point Likert-
type scales as above.
The internal reliabilities were adequate for three out of
the four scales: F!W conflict, .69; W!F conflict, .79; and
positive F!W,.69.However, the internal reliability of positive
W!F`   was only .50.We performed exploratory factor analy-
sis on all 16 items using Varimax rotation. Five factors with
eigenvalues over 1 emerged. The four W!F conflict items
loaded on the first (accounting for 21.9% of variance), the
four positive F!W items loaded on the second (accounting
for 16.2% of variance) and the four F!W conflict items
loaded on the third (11.3% of variance). However, the two
positive W!F items relating to obtaining instrumental help
loaded on the fourth (7.7) and the two positive W!F items
relating to mood and energy loaded on the fifth (6.4%).The
alpha of the two instrumental items was .74 and the alpha of
the two mood/energy items was .56.Rather than using a four-
item multidimensional measure with a low reliability to
assess positive W!F spillover,we used in this analysis a meas-
ure consisting of the two instrumental help items only.
Results
The basic statistics and intercorrelations appear in Table 1.As
conflict and positive spillovers are conceptually associated
and likely to be correlated, we first tested our hypotheses
about the differences between the self-employees through
multivariate analysis of variance with work arrangement as
the fixed factor (1 = self-employed; 0 = employee) and F!W
and W!F conflict and positive F!W and W!F spillovers as
the dependent variables. We conducted four hierarchical
regressions (with individual demographics as the first step,
46 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Table 1. Basic Statistics and Correlations
Variables M SD N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Work arrangement .60 .49 280 -
2. Age 49.78 10.15 277 .27*** -
3. Sex .35 .48 279 .05 -.28*** -
4. Marital Status .88 .33 277 -.00 .06 -.22*** -
5. Individual Income($000’s) 144.7 130.0 244 -.32*** .10 -.27*** .05 -
6. Autonomy & flexibility 6.15 1.09 280 .42*** .35*** -.03 .13* .06 (.92)
7. W!F conflict 4.27 1.41 279 -.20** -.35*** .08 -.01 .10 -.34*** (.79.)
8. F!W conflict 3.11 1.03 279 -.04 -.30*** .18** -.06 -.13* -.30*** .65*** (.60.)
9. Positive F!W 
spillover
4.21 1.23 274 .07 -.08 .17** .08 -.08 .05 .12* .11 (.69.)
10. Positive W!F 
spillover
3.36 1.52 273 .04 -.13* .19** .04 -.08 .08 .17** .26*** .28** (.74.)
Basic Statistics and Correlations
Note. Categorical variables:Work Arrangement: 1 = self-employed, 0 = employee; Sex: 1 = Female, 0 = Male;
Marital: 1 = married, 0 = Single.W!F = Work-to-Family. F!W = Family-to-Work.
*p < .05, two-tailed; **p < .01, two-tailed; ***p < .001, two-tailed.
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work arrangement as the second, and autonomy/flexibility as
the third).For our post hoc analysis of gender effects,we split
the participants into two subsamples of men and women and
repeated the multivariate analysis. Our discussion addresses
effect sizes as well as statistical significance. For correlations,
we use Cohen’s (1992) thresholds for r as small, 10; medium,
30; large, .50.We calculated the partial eta-square (ηρ2) as the
effect size for the multivariate and univariate relationships
with .01 for a small effect size, .06 for medium, and .14 for
large (Stevens, 2002).
The majority of the 280 participants were self-employed
(60%), male (65%) and married or living in a similar relation-
ship (88%). Mean age was 49.8 years (sd =10.15) and median
income was $100,000. As shown in Table 1, consistent with
prior findings, the self-employed were older (r = .27,p < .001)
and reported higher levels of job autonomy/flexibility (r =.42,
p < .001). However, this sample differed from other studies
in that being self-employed was negatively related to income
(r = -.32, p < .001).This unusual finding is likely attributable
to the number of employees with the CPA credential who
had become partners in the very large public accountancy
firms or senior treasury or finance officers in large corpora-
tions. Many of the self-employed, in contrast, were owners in
relatively small public accountancy firms.
We found very limited support for hypothesis 1a, which
predicted that the self-employed would have less W!F and
F!W conflict.The zero-order correlation with work arrange-
ment was -.20, p < .05 for W!F but insignificant for F!W
(Table 1).The multivariate univariate F statistic based on the
Wilks lambda for work arrangement was F (4,268) = 4.47,p <
.01, ηρ2 = .06. However, only the univariate relationship
between work arrangement and negative W!F spillover was
statistically significant (p < .01, ηρ2 = .04) and work arrange-
ment when entered in the second step of the hierarchical
regression was not significant (Table 2a).
Our hypothesis 1b that autonomy/flexibility would
attenuate the relationship between self-employment and
lower W!F conflict was supported. As shown in Table 1,
autonomy/flexibility was related as expected to both W!F
(r = -.34, p < .001) and F!W (r = -.30, p < .001). When
added as the third step in the hierarchical regression on
W!F conflict, autonomy/flexibility was significant (B = -
.27, p < .001) and accounted for an additional 6 percent of
variance and the B coefficient for work arrangement was
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Note. Categorical variables: sex (1 = female, 0 = male);
work arrangement (1 = self-employed, 0 = employee.
In each hierarchical regression, blocks of variables were entered in successive order:
Step 1, demographic variables; step 2, work arrangement; step 3, autonomy/flexibility.
† p = .06 .two-tailed; * p < .05, two-tailed; *** p < .001, two-tailed.
Table 2a. Hierarchical Regressions on Work-to-Family and Family-to-Work Conflict
Dependent Variables
Work-to-Family Conflict Family-to-Work Conflict
Independent Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Age -.39*** -.38*** -.32*** -.32*** -.33*** -.27***
Sex -.00 -.00 -.02 .03 .03 .05
Individual Income .14* .13 .00 -.08 -.07 -.02
Work Arrangement -.04 .07 .02 .14†
Autonomy/Flexibility -.27*** -.28***
R2 .16 .16 .22 .12 .12 .18
Total F 15.36*** 11.60*** 13.23*** 11.15*** 8.36*** 10.72***
∆R2 - .00 .06 - .00 .06
∆F - .40 16.72*** - .11 17.80***
df 3, 239 4, 238 5, 237 3, 239 4, 238 5, 237
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not significant (p = .35). Similarly, when autonomy/flexibil-
ity was entered as the third step in the hierarchical regres-
sion on F!W conflict, it was significant (B = -.28, p < .001)
and accounted for an additional 6 percent of variance.
We found no support for our hypothesis 2a, which pre-
dicted that both positive W!F and F!W spillovers would be
greater for the self-employed.As shown in Table 1, the corre-
lations were not statistically significant and did not reach the
threshold for a small effect size. Similarly, univariate relation-
ships between work arrangement and either direction of pos-
itive spillover were not statistically.
Contrary to our expectations, there were no relationships
between autonomy/flexibility and either form of positive
spillover. As shown in Table 1, the correlations were .08 for
positive F!W and .04 for W!F.Additionally,as shown in Table
2b, when autonomy/flexibility was entered as the third step
in the hierarchical regressions (after the demographics and
work arrangement) it was not significant for positive F!W 
(p = .35) although it was for W!F (B = .16, p < .05) but only
accounted for 2 percent of additional variance.
However, the results of our multivariate analysis of sub-
samples of 176 men and 97 women with work arrangement
as the fixed factor revealed interesting differences. In each
subsample, the multivariate F statistics were significant (p <
.01) and the effect sizes exceeded the threshold for medium:
men,ηρ2 = .09, women,ηρ2 = .13.The smaller female subsam-
ple size provided less statistical power than did the male sub-
sample; we will discuss all univariate relationships with
effect sizes that reached the threshold for small regardless of
their levels of statistical significance. Among males, the self-
employed had superior outcomes: less F!W (p < .05, ηρ2 =
.02) and W!F conflict (p < .01,ηρ2 = .06), and more positive
F!W (p = .12, ηρ2 = .01) spillover (with no difference with
respect to positive W!F spillover). In contrast, female self-
employed had inferior outcomes with more negative F!W
conflict (p = .13,ηρ2 = .02) and less W!F (p = .16,ηρ2 = .02)
spillovers (with no differences with respect to either positive
F!W or W!F spillovers). In short, the results for men were
similar to those we had originally hypothesized while those
for women were quite different.
Discussion
We found limited support for the view that self-employment
enables people to improve the quality of the interface
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Note. Categorical variables: sex (1 = female, 0 = male);
work arrangement (1 = self-employed, 0 = employee.
In each hierarchical regression, blocks of variables were entered in successive order:
Step 1, demographic variables; step 2, work arrangement; step 3, autonomy/flexibility.
† p = .06 .two-tailed; * p < .05, two-tailed; *** p < .001, two-tailed.
Table 2b. Hierarchical Regressions on Positive Work-to-Family and Family-to-Work Spillover
Dependent Variables
Positive Work-to-Family Spillover Positive Family-to-Work Spillover
Independent Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Age -.05 -.08 -.12 -.00 -.02 -.04
Sex .15* .14* .13† .15* .15* .15*
Individual Income -.04 -.01 -.04 -.03 -.01 -.02
Work Arrangement .09 .03 .07 .04
Autonomy/Flexibility .16* .07
R2 .03 .04 .06 .03 .03 .04
Total F 2.75* 2.44* 2.93* 2.20 1.88 1.68
∆R2 - .01 .02 - .00 .00
∆F - 1.50 4.74* - .92 .89
df 3, 235 4, 234 5, 233 3, 234 4, 235 5, 234
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between their work and family roles. The self-employed
reported substantially greater job autonomy/flexibility than
employees (with an effect size that approached the threshold
for large). Job autonomy and flexibility appears to have
allowed them to have taken actions or experienced a sense
of control such that they reported less conflict from the
work to family domains (with an effect size that approached
the threshold for medium).However,once job autonomy and
flexibility were controlled for, there was no benefit associat-
ed with self-employed left to be explained by other charac-
teristics.
There seemed to be important differences between men
and women. With respect to W!F conflict both self-
employed men and women reported lower levels than their
employee counterparts. However, the effect sizes of the dif-
ferences for men were larger than that for women (ηρ2 = .06
vs. ηρ2 = .02). With respect to F!W conflict, we found no
relationships with self-employment in the full sample but we
did when we divided the sample into men and women.
Among men,the self-employed report lower levels of conflict
relative to male employees with an effect size that
approached the threshold for medium (ηρ2 = .05). In con-
trast, women report higher levels with an effect size that
barely exceeded the threshold for small (ηρ2 = .02). Similarly,
with respect to positive F!W spillover there was an indica-
tion that self-employed men were benefited (albeit weak as p
only reached .12 although the effect size of the difference
reached the threshold of .01 for small).
Further research is required to explore the reasons for
these differences. As shown in Table 1, there was no differ-
ence between men and women with respect to the amount
of autonomy and flexibility they had and there were no dif-
ferences between the subsamples of female self-employed
and their counterparts. Other aspects of the interface
between the male and female self-employed might differ. It is
possible that the family members of a self-employed male
more readily recognize and respect him in his role as “work-
er” and reduce their demands while the family members of
women might not differentiate the roles and make the same
level of demands as they would if she were not working.
This study produced two results that may be of interest to
work-family scholars. First, the finding that responses to job
autonomy and flexibility items loaded on the same factor
should lead researchers to consider whether they are indeed
two separate constructs or whether it is worth asking partic-
ipants to distinguish between facets of autonomy (such as
with respect to when and how work is done as opposed to
how it is done). Second, the lack of relationships between
autonomy/flexibility and positive spillovers is surprising as
autonomy seems to have very strong, negative relationships
with conflict and would be expected to be a crucial resource
or ability with respect to gathering and applying the
resources that could lead to enhancement or enrichment
between roles.
Before discussing recommendations for future research,
several limitations to this study should be mentioned. First,
the internal reliabilities of our measures of conflict and posi-
tive spillover were on the lower end of adequacy and they
did not assess underlying dimensions. Second, our data col-
lection technique of self-report surveys left us with its inher-
ent weaknesses (i.e., common source and method bias).
Third, our sample was composed of CPAs who have a high
level of education and satisfied demanding professional stan-
dards. This might have attenuated some of our findings
through range restriction, and of course, raises questions
about the generalizability of our findings to other groups and
the broader population.
Future research should use newly developed and validat-
ed scales of positive spillover, such as those of Carlson et al.
(2006) or Hanson et al. (2006) to examine multiple dimen-
sions and directionality of positive spillover. With more reli-
able and multidimensional measures, differences might be
found and factors other than autonomy might account for
them.
However, as the measures of positive spillover (or
enhancement or enrichment) were developed primarily
within the context of organizational employment,
researchers should consider adding items that would address
forms of positive spillover that might not be relevant to
employees (e.g., instrumental positive spillover in the form
of paid or unpaid labor or the provision of financial capital
from relatives).Additional items should tap forms of positive
spillover that might be relevant for some employees but may
be more likely for the self-employed (e.g., increased social
capital from expanded social networks).
This research illustrates the imperative to conduct
research on work and family in different settings and with dif-
ferent populations (Casper, Eby, Bordeaux, & Lockwood,
2007: Kossek & Ozeki, 1998). It appears evident that a fuller
understanding of work and family interactions needs to take
place while simultaneously examining situational factors
such as work arrangement and factors such as gender. This
has implications with respect to the need to collect data with
a sufficient number of participants to provide statistical
power for between group and subsamples analyses.
In conclusion, our analysis of the two samples provides
evidence that self-employment may be a useful way to man-
age work and family. Relative to the organizationally
employed, the self-employed men and women experience
lower levels of work-to-family conflict and men experienced
lower less family-to-work conflict (but women more).
However, it appears that self-employment might merely have
instrumental value in that it enables people to gain more con-
trol over their jobs than they could attain by working for oth-
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ers. Further research is needed to determine whether there
may be additional benefits with respect to other dimensions
of the work-family interface and whether the integrated
nature of the lives of the self-employed—rather than a situa-
tional characteristic such as job autonomy—might account
for some of the differences.
Acknowledgment
The author expresses his appreciation to Dr. Cynthia A.Thompson for her invaluable advice and guidance.
References
Ashforth, B. E., Kreiner, G. E., & Fugate, M. (2000).All in a day’s work: Boundaries and micro role transitions. Academy of
Management Review, 25, 472–491.
Barbato, R., DeMartino, R., & Jacques, P. H. (2009).The entrepreneurial motivations of nonemployer entrepreneurs. New
England Journal of Entrepreneurship, 12, 33-42.
Beehr,T.A. (1976). Perceived situational moderators of the relationship between subjective role ambiguity and role strain.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 61, 35–40.
Bond, J.T.,Thompson, C., Galinsky, E., & Prottas, D. (2003). Highlights of the National Study of the Changing Workforce, No.
3, 2002. New York: Families and Work Institute.
Buttner, E. H., & Moore, D. P. (1997).Women’s organizational exodus to entrepreneurship: Self-reported motivations and corre-
lates with success. Journal of Small Business Management, 35, 34–46.
Caputo, R. K., & Dolinsky,A. (1998).Women’s choice to pursue self-employment: the role of financial and human capital of
household members. Journal of Small Business Management, 36, 8–17.
Carlson, D. S., Kacmar, K. M.,Wayne, J. H., & Grzywacz, J. G. (2006). Measuring the positive side of the work–family interface:
Development and validation of a work–family enrichment scale. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 68, 131–164.
Carr, D. (1996).Two paths to self-employment? Women’s and men’s self-employment in the United States, 1980. Work &
Occupations, 23, 26–53.
Casper,W. J., Eby, L.T., Bordeaux, C., & Lockwood,A. (2007).A review of research methods in IO/OB work-family research.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 28–43.
Clark, S. C. (2002). Communicating across the work/home border. Community, Work, & Family, 5, 23–48.
Cohen, J. 1992.A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 155–159.
DeMartino, R., & Barbato, R. (2003). Differences between women and men MBA entrepreneurs: exploring family flexibility
and wealth creation as career motivators. Journal of Business Venturing, 18, 815-832.
Frone, M. R. (2003).Work-family balance. In J. C. Quick & L. E.Tetrick (Eds.), Handbook of Occupational Health Psychology:
143–162.Washington, D.C.:American Psychological Association.
Ganster, D. C., Fox, M. L., & Dwyer, D. J. (2001). Explaining employees’ health care costs:A prospective examination of stressful
job demands, personal control, and physiological reactivity. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 954–964.
Greenhaus, J. H., & Beutell, N. J. (1985). Sources of conflict between work and family roles. Academy of Management Review,
10, 76–88.
Greenhaus, J. H., & Powell, G. N. 2006.When work and family are allies:A theory of work-family enrichment. Academy of
Management Review, 31: 72–92.
Grzywacz, J. G., & Marks, N. F. (2000). Reconceptualizing the work–family interface:An ecological perspective on the corre-
lates of positive and negative spillover between work and family. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 5,
111–126.
Gutek, B.W., Searle, S., & Klepa, L. 1991. Rational versus gender role explanations for work-family conflict. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 76: 560–568.
Hanson, G. C., Hammer, L. B., & Colton, C. L. (2006). Development and validation of a multidimensional scale of perceived
work–family positive spillover. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 11, 249–265.
Heilman, M. E., & Chen, J. K. (2003). Entrepreneurship as a solution:The allure of self-employment for women and minorities.
Human Resource Management Review, 13, 347–364.
50 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
50
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 15 [2012], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol15/iss1/1
Hisrich, R.D., & Brush, C. (1984).The women entrepreneur: Management skills and business problems. Journal of Small
Business Management, 22, 30–37.
Hobfoll, S. E. (1989). Conservation of resources:A new attempt at conceptualizing stress. American Psychologist, 44, 513–524.
Hughes, K. D. (2003). Pushed or pulled? Women’s entry into self-employment and small business ownership. Gender, Work
and Organization, 10, 443–454.
Hundley, G. (2001).What and when are the self-employed more satisfied with their work? Industrial Relations, 40, 293–316.
Kanter, R. M. (1977). Work and family in the United States:A critical review and agenda for research and policy. New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Karasek, R. (1979). Job demands, job decision latitude and mental strain: Implications for job redesign. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 24, 285–306.
Kopelman, R. E., Greenhaus, J. H., & Connolly,T. F. (1983).A model of work, family and interrole conflict:A construct validation
study. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 32, 198-215.
Kossek, E. E., & Ozeki, C. (1998).Work-family conflict, policies, and the job-life satisfaction relationship:A review and direc-
tions for organizational behavior-human resources research. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 139–149.
Loscocco, K.A. (1997).Work-family linkages among self-employed women and men. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 50,
204–226.
Moore, D. P. (1999).Women entrepreneurs:Approaching a new millennium. In G. N. Powell (ed.), Handbook of Gender and
Work (pp. 371-389). Sage Publishers:Thousand Oaks, CA.
Neider, L. (1987).A preliminary investigation of female entrepreneurs in Florida. Journal of Small Business Management, 25,
22–29.
Parasuraman, S., & Simmers, C.A. (2001).Type of employment, work–family conflict and well-being:A comparative study.
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22, 551–568.
Parasuraman, S., Purohit,Y. S., Godshalk,V. M., & Beutell, N. J. (1996).Work and family variables, entrepreneurial career success
and psychological well-being. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 48, 275–300.
Parker S. R. (1967). Industry and the family. In S. R. Parker, R. K. Brown, J. Child, & M.A. Smith. (Eds.), Sociology of Industry,
45–55. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
Prottas, D. J. (2007).Attitudes toward occupation, job life, and family:Translators as independent contractors, owners, and
employees. Journal of Business and Entrepreneurship, 19, 16–30.
Prottas, D. J., & Thompson, C.A. (2006). Stress, satisfaction, and the work-family interface:A comparison of self-employed busi-
ness owners, independents, and organizational employees. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 11, 366–378.
Quinn, R.P., & Staines, G.L. (1979). The 1977 quality of employment survey. Survey Research Center.Ann Arbor, MI: Survey
Research Center.
Reynolds, J., & Renzulli, L.A. (2005). Economic freedom or self-imposed strife:Work-life conflict, gender, and self-employment.
Entrepreneurship Research in the Sociology of Work, 15, 33–60.
Stevens, J. P. (2002). Applied multivariate statistics for the social sciences. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Stoner, C. R., Hartman, R. I., & Arora, R. (1990).Work-home conflict in female owners of small businesses:An exploratory study.
Journal of Small Business Management, 28, 30–38.
Tetrick, L. E., Slack, K. J., Da Silva, & Sinclair, R. R. (2000).A comparison of stress-strain process for business owners and
nonowners: Differences in job demands, emotional exhaustion, satisfaction, and social support. Journal of Occupational
Health Psychology, 5, 464–476.
Thompson, C.A., Kopelman, R.E., & Schriesheim, C.A. (1992). Putting all one’s eggs in the same basket:A comparison of com-
mitment and satisfaction among self- and organizationally employed men. Journal of Applied Psychology, 77, 738–743.
Voydanoff, P. (2004).The effects of work demands and resources on work-to-family conflict and facilitation. Journal of
Marriage and Family, 66, 398–412.
SELF VS. ORGANIZATIONAL EMPLOYMENT: THE NEGLECTED CASE OF POSITIVE SPILLOVER 51
51
et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Spring/Fall 2012
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2012
52 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
About the Author
DAVID PROTTAS (prottas@adelphi.edu) is an Associate Professor at the Robert W.Willumstad School of Business
at Adelphi University. He teaches undergraduate and graduate classes in human resource management and
negotiation. He has published empirical and theoretical articles in the work/family area. His other areas of
research interest include psychological characteristics of the self-employed and outcomes related to self-
employment, perceived behavioral integrity, and leadership and management practices. He received his PhD
in Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management from the CUNY Graduate Center (Baruch
College) after spending more than two decades as a corporate and investment banker in New York, London,
Miami, and Buenos Aires. He previously earned his MBA from the University of Chicago and his BA from Vassar
College.
52
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 15 [2012], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol15/iss1/1
 Ne
w
En
gl
an
d
Jo
ur
na
lo
fE
nt
re
pr
en
eu
rs
hi
p
Vo
lu
m
e
15
N
um
be
r1
/2
Sp
rin
g/
Fa
ll2
01
2
New
England
Journal
ofEntrepreneurship
John
F
.W
elch
College
ofBusiness
Sacred
H
eartUniversity
5151
Park
A
ve
n
u
e
Fairfield,Connecticut06825-1000
53
et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Spring/Fall 2012
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2012
